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ABSTRACT
Investment treaties protect foreign investors who contract with
sovereign states. It remains unclear, however, whether parties are
free to contract around these treaty rules, or whether treaty provisions should be understood as mandatory terms that constrain party
choice. While investment treaties clearly apply to contracts in some
way, they are silent as to how these instruments ultimately interact.
Moreover, arbitral jurisprudence has varied wildly on this point,
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creating significant problems of certainty, efficiency, and fairness—for states and foreign investors alike.
This Article reappraises the treaty/contract issue from the ex ante
perspective of contracting states and foreign investors. I advance
three main claims: one conceptual, one descriptive, and one normative. First, I argue that investment treaties must be understood as
having generated a rudimentary, yet broad, law of contracts—governing agreements between states and foreign investors on pivotal
issues, from substantive rights and duties, to damages and forum
selection. Second, I argue that this emerging international law of
contracts has developed sporadically, irregularly, and inconsistently,
due in part to a tendency among tribunals to confuse the logics of
contract and property. As a result, it remains undecided whether contracting parties should understand background treaty norms as
defaults, sticky defaults, or mandatory terms—leaving the meaning
of their contracts under a cloud of doubt. Third, I argue that the best
way to resolve this problem for both states and investors, ex ante, is
generally to privilege their contractual arrangements over background treaty rules. Even when these parties have different interests
and values at stake, the treaty/contract problem is not zero-sum.
Both sides usually stand to benefit from the freedom to negotiate
around treaty rules as mere defaults—though I explore certain cases
where treaty norms might justifiably exert a greater pull. In general,
prioritizing party choice is not only optimal from the economic
standpoint—it also provides states with the tools to secure their
future capacities to regulate in the public interest.
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INTRODUCTION
A traditional maxim of international law holds that all contracts
are purely instruments of some domestic legal order.1 Until very
recently a contract between a private party and a foreign state, like
any contract between private parties, would create rights and obligations under only the domestic law chosen by the parties. Today,
however, this maxim is no longer correct.2 Most clearly in the realm
of sales, the 1980 Convention on the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) has established a robust regime governing transnational
contracts for the sale of goods, supplementing such instruments
with a host of default and mandatory terms.3 More recently, and far
more quietly, a regime of international contract law has emerged in
the field of foreign direct investment (FDI). A great deal of international contracting takes place under a manifold of treaties for the
protection of foreign investments, which augment contracts between
states and foreign investors—in whole or in part—with international legal rules. The advent of this world of investment treaties
has subtly brought into being a rudimentary law of contracts—a
broad complex of default and mandatory rules that alter contracts
between states and foreign investors in relation to all kinds of
questions, from the conditions of breach and defenses, to damages
and forum selection. However, unlike the CISG, this emerging law
of contracts has developed only sporadically, inconsistently, and
irregularly. Contracts between states and foreign investors are no
longer purely instruments of national law. But a better international law of contracts is essential if we are to remain sensitive to both
the needs of foreign capital and the vitality of local and global public
values.
1. See, e.g., Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Serb.), Judgment,
1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 14, at 41 (July 12) (“Any contract which is not a contract between
States in their capacity as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some
country.”).
2. See Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 229-30 (2015).
3. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art.
6, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 60 [hereinafter CISG] (“The parties may exclude the application of the Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions.”).
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The root of the problem is that investment treaties tend to say
nothing, or only very little, about how they relate to contracts.4 They
often clearly apply to contracts between states and covered foreign
investors (state contracts), either explicitly or by evident implication.5 Some treaties even incorporate provisions that equate breach
of a state contract with breach of the treaty (the “umbrella clause”).6
But for the most part, investment treaties do not spell out the consequences of their application to contracts—for questions of breach,
defenses, forum selection, calculating damages, or the whole host of
terms articulating the life of any contractual agreement.7 From the
perspective of contract theory, crucial questions remain totally
unaddressed: Are treaty rules on such matters defaults that the
contracting parties can simply negotiate around, or are they mandatory rules that take precedence over conflicting contractual provisions? If mere defaults, how difficult is it for the parties to opt-out?
What level of clarity or specificity is required, and why? Are the
answers the same for all kinds of treaty provisions, or are some
mandatory and some merely default? Are some defaults “stickier”
than others? And what about the parties’ contractual choice of law—
what is the proper relationship between the demands of the treaty
and the whole host of rules selected by the parties by implication,
through their choice of law clause?
The broad problem can be illustrated through a simplified hypothetical. Assume that two countries, Acadia and Ruritania, have
established a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) to promote and
4. See James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L
351, 360-61 (2008); Arato, supra note 2, at 249.
5. See Arato, supra note 2, at 249.
6. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 166-78 (2d ed. 2012).
7. The closest these treaties come to defining their relationship to contracts is by
requiring investor-state tribunals to apply both national law (contract) and international law
(treaty), with priority to the latter in case of conflict. See Crawford, supra note 4, at 353. But
this conflicts rule applies only if treaty provisions are presumed mandatory. See id. Express
contract terms would not properly “conflict” with diverging defaults. See Richard Craswell,
Freedom of Contract 1-2 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 33, 1995).
For a clear example of this relationship in international law, private parties are expressly
empowered to contract around most provisions of the CISG—a multilateral treaty enacted
exclusively by states. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 6. (“The parties,” meaning the private
parties to a covered sales contract, “may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject
to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”).
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protect the flow of investment across their territories. The treaty
lists contracts as covered investments, along with real property,
intellectual property, and so on. It further guarantees foreign investors against expropriation, requiring that an expropriating state
compensate the investor for the “fair market value” of her loss. As
will be discussed below, in contract cases this standard of damages
is generally taken to mean expectation damages.8 By contrast,
assume that the Ruritanian law of public contracts guarantees investors only reasonable reliance damages when the state breaches—
so as not to bind the government’s hands if future regulatory
exigencies arise.9 An Acadian investor contracts with the government of Ruritania to operate a dolomite quarry for twenty years.
The contract comes under Ruritanian law and makes no express
mention of damages. Ten years into the deal, Ruritania cancels the
contract, citing newly discovered environmental concerns about
dolomite mining. Assuming an expropriation occurred, which standard of damages controls? The domestic standard (reliance damages) or the treaty standard (expectation damages)? And what if the
parties had included a provision in their contract expressly limiting
damages (liquidated damages)? Surprisingly, international investment law does not adequately resolve these questions.
This Article grapples with the treaty/contract problem systematically as a question of contract theory. I argue that privileging
party-choice in the context of transnational investment contracts is
the best way to protect both the private law values of fairness and
efficiency and the state’s capacity to govern in the public interest.
From the ex ante perspective of contracting states and foreign investors, the ultimate relationship between treaty and contract will
be of fundamental importance. As a purely commercial matter, the
relative rigidity or flexibility of the treaty regime will bear strongly
on the parties’ ability to negotiate efficiently. At the same time, as
a political matter, these questions will determine whether and how
a state desiring FDI might effectively work protections for its future

8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 957-58 (2011); see also Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty
and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, S. CAL. INTERDISC . L.J. 467,
469 (1999).
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capacity to regulate into its contractual arrangements with foreign
investors. Thus it is unsettling that the treaty/contract relationship
remains generally undecided and, moreover, that it is so often decided the wrong way.
Uncertainty is the more glaring problem. It is clearly undesirable
for all parties if, ex ante, they cannot predict whether tribunals will
give effect to their contractual efforts to opt out of treaty rules ex
post. Yet, in the face of treaty silence on the treaty/contract issue,
arbitral jurisprudence has been highly uneven and irregular—often
resolving these questions merely on the level of assumptions.10 As
a result, the meaning of state contracts in the world of investment
treaties remains under a cloud of doubt.
But the deeper problem is that tribunals too often slip into an
overly rigid and formalistic approach, prioritizing treaty provisions
over negotiated contractual bargains.11 This tendency is usually bad
policy, with negative implications for both states and investors. It
undercuts the autonomy of the parties, thereby undermining their
capacity to allocate risk as they see fit. For the investor, this means
risks associated with the viability and profitability of the project.
States share those commercial concerns but also bear responsibility
for the full range of noncommercial values of import in their
respective societies. States negotiating investment contracts thus
have to seriously manage the risk that any such project might
create future regulatory chill. In other words, the tendency of
arbitral tribunals to implicitly prioritize treaty norms over states’
and investors’ contractual arrangements ultimately reduces both
parties’ ex ante flexibility to negotiate efficiently. At the same time,
this weakens the state’s capacity to define the scope of its potential
future liability under an investment treaty through contract, which
will tend to disincentivize openness to foreign capital in the long
run—the very goal that investment treaties are meant to achieve.
Much of the confusion arises out of the fact that investment
treaties apply to both foreign-owned property and contracts between
states and foreign investors, without drawing much of a distinction
between these categories. Investment treaties are designed and
interpreted with property protection in mind—a Blackstonian vision
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
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of property law, oriented around fixed rules for particular assets.12
For example, they classically protect foreign-owned real and personal property from expropriation and other forms of interference.
But these treaties typically apply to a much broader, open-ended
category of “investments,” including contracts between sovereigns
and foreign investors.13 What does it mean for a treaty to afford
protection to a contract?
By contrast to property, the logic of contract is normally oriented
around party choice. Parties choose the basic rules that bind them.
To the extent that contracts are supplemented by default rules, or
even altered by mandatory provisions under a particular domestic
legal order, the goal is usually to give better effect to what the
parties wanted,14 or to impute what they would have wanted had
they considered an issue.15 Of course national laws of contract occasionally entail certain mandatory rules and sticky defaults that
protect important areas of public policy rather than party choice—
and some nations more than others.16 But in essence, if the law of
property is the realm of fixed categories and rigid rules, the law of
contract is the realm of flexibility and choice.17 One might think
that, to the extent investment treaties apply to contracts at all, they
would do so in a way tailored toward effectuating the parties’ contractual arrangements. Yet investment treaties are often interpreted as applying to contracts in much the same way as they apply
to property, imposing rules that take precedence over provisions
agreed to by the contracting parties. Quite apart from the issue of

12. See Arato, supra note 2, at 234, 238 & n.33. See generally Jason Webb Yackee, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative
Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397, 406 (2011).
13. See Arato, supra note 2, at 231; Yackee, supra note 12, at 402-03.
14. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
57-73 (2d ed. 2015).
15. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM . L.
REV. 1603, 1631-33 (2009); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (advancing the
concept of “penalty defaults,” which set background rules at levels the parties would not have
wanted in order to incentivize parties to contract out—for example, to reveal information).
16. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL A. HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
(forthcoming 2017).
17. Arato, supra note 2, at 286; see also HANOCH DAGAN , PROPERTY: VALUES AND
INSTITUTIONS 83-84 (2011).
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uncertainty, this kind of rigidity poses significant problems for
states and investors alike.
This Article makes three main claims: one conceptual, one
descriptive, and one normative. Conceptually, I argue that investment treaties create contract law—if only informally. Their merits,
in this regard, thus have to be analyzed and assessed in terms of
contract theory. Critically, the treaty/contract issue cannot be properly understood without taking into account the ex ante perspective
of the parties to an investment contract. It matters to contracting
parties whether they are able to contract around treaty rules.
Formalities aside, it must be understood that the resolution of the
treaty/contract question will have a deep material effect on the
meaning of any state contract negotiated against the background of
an applicable investment treaty. These effects must be understood
(and evaluated) from the point of view of those economic operators
whose activity investment treaties seek to stimulate: foreign investors and states.18 This perspectival shift helps illuminate the deep
indeterminacy in the arbitral jurisprudence on the treaty/contract
issue and reveals a better path.
This Article’s descriptive claim is that, in the face of treaty
silence, answers to these questions have been few, irregular, and
generally thinly justified. Arbitral tribunals have come down on all
sides of this issue, privileging treaty over contract here, and contract over treaty there.19 If anything, tribunals slightly tend toward
the former position—but they usually resolve the issue only
implicitly. I argue that, as things stand, the vagaries surrounding
the treaty/contract issue create real problems of predictability,
efficiency, and fairness that are now beginning to come to light in
practice.

18. Cf., mutatis mutandis, Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act
of 1974, ¶¶ 7.81-7.82, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section
301] (indicating, in the context of the WTO, that in interpreting a “treaty the benefits of which
depend in part on the activity of individual operators,” an interpreter must take the perspective of such operators into account in order to give effect to the treaty’s object and purpose).
Indeed, the Section 301 Panel noted that in the WTO/GATT context “[t]he rationale in all
types of cases has always been the negative effect on economic operators.” Id. ¶ 7.84.
19. See infra Part II.D.
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Normatively, I argue that the prevailing interpretive tendency to
subordinate contractual choice to treaty rules is usually bad policy.20
It creates unjustified impediments on the state’s ability to regulate,
which in turn impedes both states’ and investors’ capacity to
negotiate and contract efficiently ex ante. All this potentially
hinders the very flow of foreign capital that investment treaties are
meant to induce. I contend that, as a general principle, states and
foreign investors should be able to freely contract around treaty
rules—left, in other words, to manage their respective risks as they
see fit. While there may be some cases where treaty rules should be
difficult, or even impossible, to contract around, such instances
must be carefully justified—either in terms of values immanent to
the logic of contract (like information sharing) or external values
(like environmental protection).
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by exploring the
meaning of a contract and attempts to analytically separate a number of ways in which we might think about the relationship between
investment treaties and the contracts to which they apply. I start
from the position that any contract is a complex legal instrument,
often going far beyond its express terms. The codified choices of the
parties are always supplemented by a great many default and
mandatory provisions, drawn from the applicable “law of contracts.”
I argue that thinking in terms of default rules, sticky defaults, and
mandatory terms provides the right rubric for understanding the
possible interactions between investment treaties and state
contracts.
Part II examines how investment tribunals have approached
these questions in practice, and how they have justified their approaches (if at all). I focus principally on rules relating to the protection of investor expectations, damages, and forum selection. In each
area it will become apparent that answers have been inconsistent,
irregular, and almost always left implicit. However, the tribunals
tend to assume that treaty rules are effectively mandatory, or at
least highly sticky.
Part III advances a normative argument about how the
treaty/contract issue ought to be approached when left ambiguous

20. See infra Part III.
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by the treaty text. I argue that, in general, the principle ought to be
that explicit contractual terms prevail over treaty provisions as the
authentic expression of the contracting parties’ division of risk. As
a matter of treaty interpretation, the presumption that treaties
create mere defaults hews closest to the object and purpose of investment treaties—namely, to protect and promote foreign direct
investment. Moreover, there are strong policy reasons for understanding most treaty rules as mere defaults based in both the
structure of private law (like efficiency and party autonomy) and
extrinsic public values (such as public health, the environment, and
the state’s capacity to regulate and to control its liability for major
privatization projects more generally). Yet all this should be taken
only as a presumption. There may be good reasons why, in certain
cases, treaty rules ought to be understood as sticky defaults—even
when the treaty text gives no indication one way or the other. Here
I explore the possibility that forum selection clauses and general
exceptions provisions might be justifiable candidates. But, crucially,
I argue that in all such cases adjudicators must justify constraining
the principle of choice in light of the values of international investment law—a regime best understood as a system of private law
sensitive to public values.
I. REGULATION AND CHOICE IN TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACT LAW
This Part briefly considers the meaning of a contract in both
domestic and transnational legal orders. I first distinguish between
formal and material conceptions of the contract in the context of
diverse background rules in national legal systems. Second, I examine the meaning of a contract within the transnational system of
international investment law, distinguishing between the logics of
property and contract. I then provide an ideal-typical schema for
exploring the possible relationships between treaty and contract to
frame the analysis in the descriptive and normative Parts that
follow.
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A. Party Choice and Background Rules: Defaults, Sticky Defaults,
and Mandatory Terms
As Robert Scott puts it, the express terms of a contract reflect
only the tip of the iceberg.21 In all national legal orders, contracts
are formally (and sometimes informally) augmented by a manifold
of legal rules, covering all kinds of matters—from basic obligations
like good faith, defenses, and damages to procedural rights like forum selection.22 For the parties, all of these matters have a value.
They are all potential price terms—terms which parties factor into
the price of the contract, and regularly dicker over in negotiating
their deals. Thus, from both the legal and the economic perspectives,
the full meaning of a contract can only be appreciated in light of a
host of regulatory, legislative, and constitutional rules that affect its
disposition.23
Though the parties may not have explicitly negotiated over the
apposite background rules, all such terms must be considered part
of the deal—and sophisticated parties will have to take this edifice
into account ex ante in their negotiations. For an example from U.S.
law, if a domestic company contracts with the City of Chicago to set
up municipal parking meters, the private party will want to know
whether the government retains the right to back out of the contract
or to vitiate its value through regulatory action.24 Absent any
explicit agreement by the parties, the background rules of the Illinois law of public contracts will obviously affect the terms of the
deal and will have to either be priced in or contracted around.
Similarly, even if the government is not entitled to simply back out,
the investor will want to consider whether any special rules about
public contracts entitle the city to pay only limited damages in case
of regulatory breach.25 As it happens, in many domestic systems,
including the United States, the law of public contracts often subjects states only to reliance damages by default—not expectation
21. Professor Scott uses this turn of phrase in his lectures. For the core idea, see Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 133 YALE L.J.
541, 544 (2003).
22. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 88.
23. See id. at 87-88.
24. See Serkin, supra note 9, at 895.
25. See id. at 916.
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damages.26 Such background rules on damages are price terms,
which sophisticated private parties must either stomach, price in,
or contract around through express language on indemnification for
regulatory change.
Not all background rules relate to contracts in the same way. Ian
Ayres usefully distinguishes between defaults, sticky defaults, and
mandatory rules.27 Classically, default rules supplement contracts
and fill gaps, and parties are free to contract around them.28
Mandatory rules, by contrast, cannot be contracted around.29 Sticky
defaults lie somewhere in between.30 They can be contracted around,
but doing so requires more concerted action than with ordinary
defaults—typically some requirement of clear statement or via the
adoption of certain formalities in the contract.31
Mandatory rules are justifiable only where they protect some
value, which might be intrinsic to the logic of contract (like equality
of information or the protection of unsophisticated parties)32 or
extrinsic public goods (like the prohibition on slavery).33 Like mandatory rules, sticky defaults are meant to protect certain values—though to a weaker degree.34 Typically, the values concerned
here are relational and would not be undercut if informed and
sophisticated parties were to opt out.35 Moreover, sticky defaults
may be more or less difficult to contract around. Some may be subject only to clear statement rules.36 Others might be stickier, requiring parties to use special language.37 For example, in cases where
parties are likely to have asymmetric information, stickiness can
have the function of forcing better-informed parties to disclose
information to their counterparties by insisting that attempts to
26. See id.
27. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE
L.J. 2032, 2042, 2084 (2012).
28. See id. at 2034.
29. See id. at 2087.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 16 (manuscript at ch. 10) (on file with author).
33. See Craswell, supra note 7, at 1-2.
34. See Ayres, supra note 27, at 2084.
35. See id. at 2088.
36. See id. at 2037.
37. See id.
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contract out must use language that discloses the necessary information.38 In general, however, mandatory rules and sticky defaults
are the exception.39 Absent compelling justification in intrinsic or
extrinsic values, it is generally best to leave it to the parties to allocate risk and price amongst themselves as they see fit—choice is,
after all, the central fundament of contract, key to the core private
law values of autonomy, utility, and community.40
In transnational contracts the situation becomes more complex in
a number of ways. First, it should be recognized that investment
contracts are not always negotiated under the law of the host state;
often, the parties negotiate over the law of the contract by incorporating a “choice of law” provision.41 The parties’ choice of law
dictates, in the first cut, which national law will apply to their contract, thereby filling gaps through default rules and potentially
augmenting its express terms via sticky defaults and mandatory
terms.42 Still so far, the situation is still basically similar to the
above.
Second, such contracts may come under the ambit of an international treaty, which imposes its own set of default rules—as with
transnational sales contracts coming under the ambit of the eightyfour party CISG. That multilateral treaty expressly imposes its own
set of (mostly default) background contract terms, which displace
any conflicting defaults or mandatory terms in the national law of
the contract. Still, private contracting parties are able to contract
around the CISG if they do so explicitly—hardly anything in it is
mandatory. Given the multiplicity of legal orders involved, things
are here already more complex—but at least in the context of the
CISG the basic structure and hierarchy of norms is clear. The
meaning of any covered sales contract can be ascertained only by
careful analysis of the express terms of the contract (in the first
instance), as supplemented by a web of background terms found in
the CISG, and with any remaining gaps filled by the national law of
the contract.
38. See id. at 2062.
39. See id. at 2087-88.
40. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 16.
41. See George A. Zaphiriou, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International
Commercial Agreements, 3 INT’L TRADE L.J. 311, 311 (1978).
42. See id.
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Investment treaties provide a more vexing wrinkle. Insofar as an
investment treaty applies to contracts between the state and a
foreign investor, it becomes—like the CISG—an additional source
of background rules.43 As with transnational sales contracts, any
such investment contract may be augmented by defaults and
mandatory provisions arising out of two legal orders—the chosen
domestic law of the contract and any opposable international
investment treaty. The problem here is that it is not at all clear how
investment treaties, national contract law, and express contract
terms are supposed to interact.
What is clear, however, is that these relationships matter to
states and investors alike. The bottom line is that, from the ex ante
perspective of the contracting parties, any background treaty rules
that apply to the contract must be considered materially part of the
deal. Without clarity as to how such treaties and contracts will ultimately relate, it is impossible for contracting states and investors
to know just what kind of legal arrangements they are getting into.
B. Contract Versus Property in International Investment Law
One major source of the confusion surrounding the treaty/contract question arises out of the treaties themselves. In extending
their coverage to a wide range of “investments,” these treaties tend
to muddy the lines between contract, classical forms of property,
and a myriad other assets.44
Investment treaties are agreements between two or more states,
governing interactions between each state and foreign private parties hailing from the other(s).45 Their twin purposes are to protect
foreign investors’ assets and promote FDI.46 They codify a number
43. See Investment Treaties, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.iisd.org/
investment/law/treaties.aspx [https://perma.cc/M8CN-V3ER].
44. See Arato, supra note 2, at 271. For a rare counterexample, see Philip Morris Brand
Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 267-270 (July 8, 2016)
[hereinafter Philip Morris v. Uruguay] (carefully distinguishing the trademarks at issue from
classical real property, finding that, unlike the latter, the former generally do not include
rights of use insulated from state action); id. ¶ 423 (distinguishing between trademarks and
contracts, for purposes of determining the content of legitimate expectations protected under
fair and equitable treatment (FET)).
45. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 13.
46. See id. at 22, 29-30.
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of basic protections, framed largely in the style of property rules—in
particular, guarantees against expropriation and standards like
“fair and equitable treatment” (FET).47 These protections are generally explicitly or implicitly linked to rules on damages.48 Investment
treaties also create important procedural protections for investors.
Critically, they endow private investors with the capacity to sue
states directly before international arbitral tribunals (investor-state
dispute settlement), and they key into powerful mechanisms for the
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.49 Put another way, investment treaties seek to promote FDI by mitigating three typical areas
of risk: the risk that a host state will afford insufficient protection
to the investment as time goes on; risks associated with suing a
sovereign state, as a foreigner, before its own courts; and the risk
that, upon losing at litigation, a state will simply refuse to pay up.
Though framed as treaties establishing rules for the protection of
foreign property—in other words, property law—these treaties apply
to a surprisingly broad range of assets, including not only real and
personal property, but also intellectual property, going concerns,
and a vast range of contracts with the state (state contracts).50
There has been some debate about the extent of these treaties’
scope.51 But there has been precious little discussion about whether
they apply to all covered assets in precisely the same way.52
47. See id. at 13.
48. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: A
SEQUAL, at 88-89, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5, U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.15 (2012),
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SP7-FB9H].
49. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 310.
50. See id. at 62-63.
51. See Poštová Banka, A.S. v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award, ¶ 333
(Apr. 9, 2015) (sovereign debt did not qualify as a covered asset); SGS Société Générale de
Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶ 93 (Feb. 12, 2010) [hereinafter SGS v. Paraguay] (noting that a one-off contract for the sale
of goods might not qualify as an investment).
52. This Article represents part of a broader project, in which I seek to disaggregate how
investment treaties are applied to different categories of investment, in light of the varied
values that different corners of private law seek to promote. See Arato, supra note 2, at 247,
292 (regarding contract and property); see also Zachary Douglas, Property, Investment, and
the Scope of Investment Protection Obligations, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW : BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 363 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn,
& Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2014) (distinguishing between property, contract, and value as
different categories of investment); Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to
Commodity to Asset: How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36
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Here we are concerned with contracts specifically, and to draw out
the treaty/contract problem it is enough to contrast the basic orientation of contract law with the law of real property. I put to the side
the normative substantive question of how far these treaties ought
to protect foreign property rights,53 and focus only on the form of
that protection. Whatever we think about the content of the various
substantive and procedural treaty standards, it is fairly clear that
they are meant to apply to foreign property holdings in much the
same way that national property law would. Investment treaties
afford a set of consistent protections to foreign property owners, in
order to mitigate certain risks and induce FDI. In the context of
property, it makes sense that these protections are relatively certain, rigid, and stable. This resonates well with the logic of property,
where a putative investor relies on a received regime of property law
in planning an investment, for example in land development.54 The
law of property affords only limited space for investors to choose
how the law will apply to their holdings.55 Investors may have
options, but property law places little emphasis on choice.56 The
rules are not generally up for discussion—they just have to be
known (or knowable) in advance.
The logic of contract has a different orientation. Here, the general principle is that parties have the capacity to regulate themselves—to negotiate and allocate risk as they see fit.57 True, as
explained above, they do so against a complex background of
MICH . J. INT’L L. 557, 560 (2015) (exploring how investment treaties seem to “propertize” IP).
But see Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶¶ 267-270 (July 8, 2016)
(distinguishing trademarks from classical forms of property).
53. As I have suggested elsewhere, arbitral tribunals have tended to assume an overly
rigid “Blackstonian” vision of property in interpreting investment treaties, which may well
go too far toward displacing the state’s capacity to define the scope of property rights. See
Arato, supra note 2, at 247. It is certainly up for debate whether the dominant conception of
property in arbitral jurisprudence affords states sufficient flexibility, or—more crudely—whether investment treaties afford too much substantive protection to foreign property.
However, these questions necessitate going too far afield for present purposes, and I confine
a more systematic treatment of the concept of property in international investment law to a
future paper.
54. See id. at 238 n.33.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 286.
57. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 16 (manuscript at 16); Arato, supra note 2, at 238
n.33; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 87-88.
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norms—which fills gaps and occasionally nudges parties to contract
in certain ways (sticky defaults) or even forces them to do so (mandatory rules).58 But the basic principle is that parties get to choose
how to govern their relations.
While it is perfectly clear how investment treaties apply to foreign
property holdings, it is much less obvious how their varied provisions ought to act on a contract between a foreigner and a state.
Clearly treaties apply to contracts, but it remains unclear whether
and to what extent their provisions should augment contractual arrangements between the parties—or even displace them. The issue
is almost invariably undecided in the treaties and is too often
overlooked when it comes to arbitration.59
As will be discussed further in Part III, there are two main harms
here. The first is more glaring—the jurisprudence on this issue is
highly irregular and inconsistent, leaving significant uncertainty
about the meaning of contracts between states and foreign investors
where an investment treaty applies. Even assuming perfect rationality among states and foreign investors, such uncertainty provides
a serious hurdle to efficient contracting and makes it extremely
difficult for states to manage potential risks to their regulatory autonomy. The second potential harm lies in making the wrong choice
about how treaties and contracts ought to interact. Too often,
tribunals simply assume that treaties apply to contracts as they
would to any other asset: on the property model.60 In other words,
there is a tendency in investor-state jurisprudence to treat contracts
as assets subject to a fixed set of treaty rules.61 As I argue in Part
III, this confusion creates significant inefficiencies that harm both
states and investors.
58. See Ayres, supra note 27, at 2084.
59. Crawford and Abi-Saab are among the few authorities to have recognized the problem.
See Crawford, supra note 4, at 352-53; ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab to Decision
on Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶ 32 (Feb. 19, 2015) [hereinafter ConocoPhillips] (“[A] treaty claim
is necessarily based on a right that has been allegedly violated. If this right is created by
contract, it is this contract that governs its legal existence and the modalities of this existence,
including its contents and limits.” (emphasis added)). Abi-Saab adds, “To assert, as does the
Majority, that the treaty applies, without taking into consideration the terms of the contract,
amounts to revising and rewriting the contract.” Id. ¶ 29.
60. See Arato, supra note 2, at 231.
61. See id. at 271.
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C. How Might Treaty and Contract Relate?
The starting point cannot be overstated: as soon as we decide that
an investment treaty applies to contracts, we create an international law of contracts—even if only partial, thin, and rudimentary. This
much international investment law has already done. What remains
to be determined is what kind of law of contracts it is: whether this
regime should be understood as thin or thick, rudimentary or
sophisticated; and what values such choices might serve. As the
next Part will suggest, these choices remain very much open, thanks
to vague treaty language and highly varied jurisprudence. But
before turning to the cases, it is worth conceptually schematizing
the possible relationships between treaty and contract, to organize
our analysis going forward.
In assessing how treaty and contract might interact, what matters are the material relationships. We must not only look at the
treaty terms that are formally applicable to contracts, but also to
any provisions that materially affect the disposition of the contractual deal—even if only implicitly. The most obvious formal provision
is the “umbrella clause” which equates most breaches of contract
with a breach of the treaty.62 But provisions guaranteeing investors
FET, or protecting their assets from regulatory takings (“indirect
expropriation”), can also strongly affect the disposition of the
contract—for example, by protecting an investor’s expectations, by
providing more favorable measures of damages than might be
available under the law of the contract, or by providing access to
advantageous international fora.63 What matters from the ex ante
point of view of the contracting parties, and what should matter
from the point of view of dispute settlers ex post, is the material
scope of the deal.
Schematically, there are four types of relationships available between a treaty provision and a contract. The first possibility is that
a treaty rule has no effect on any contractual provision. The latter
62. See Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment
Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW : UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRADE IN NOVATIONS 101, 102 (2008), https://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagree
ments/40471535.pdf [https://perma.cc/42V8-LFGJ].
63. See Rudolf Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA
J. INT’L L. 7, 11-12 (2013).
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totally contracts out of the former. Here the explicit terms of the
contract take precedence, as do all default and mandatory terms
incorporated therein through the choice of law provision. The entire
meaning of the agreement is determined by domestic law, except in
the rare instance where the treaty fills gaps left by both the express
contract and domestic background rules. Note that this is close to
the position that the treaty does not apply to the contract at all, and
most forcefully separates the logic of contract from the logic of property rules. It is, however, difficult to square with the text of most
treaties, which generally clearly indicate that they apply to contracts in some way—as covered investments.
The second possibility is that a treaty rule does not supplant any
express choice by the parties but may augment background rules in
the relations between the parties. By this view, the treaty rule
displaces any conflicting background rules set by the domestic law
of the contract but still only fills gaps in any particular contract.64
The parties can contract out of the treaty rule with no added difficulty. The CISG explicitly adopts this approach for transnational
sales contracts.65 I suggest below that most of the time this also
represents the better approach in the law of foreign direct
investment—most resonant with both the goals of investment
treaties and the logic of contract.
The third possibility is that a treaty rule creates a sticky default,
which parties can contract around only under certain conditions—
typically via requiring certain formalities, or a clear statement
rule.66 For example, if a treaty makes international arbitration
available as a forum for resolving disputes, it might be held that the
contracting parties can waive the treaty rule only if they do so in a
certain way. The rule might require an exceptionally clear waiver.67
An even stickier rule would require specific language to validate a
64. See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 169 (Jan. 29, 2004)
[hereinafter SGS v. Philippines] (finding that the contracting parties had contracted around
the treaty provision providing for investor-state arbitration). Crawford and Douglas come
closest to this view in discussing exclusive forum selection clauses. See Crawford, supra note
4, at 363; Douglas, supra note 52, at 363.
65. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 6.
66. See Ayres, supra note 27, at 2048 (discussing sticky defaults in domestic law).
67. See id.
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waiver—that is, by only recognizing waivers of BIT jurisdiction that
mention the treaty by name.68
Fourth, a treaty term might impose a mandatory rule that cannot
be waived under any circumstances. Few explicitly argue that investment treaty provisions are fully mandatory, though occasionally
commentators have explored whether it might not be possible to
waive treaty protection by contract in toto.69 However, this kind of
approach is implicit in some of the cases, discussed further below,
in which tribunals make assumptions that effectively render treaty
provisions impossible to contract around.
Note that these categories are ideal types. There is no reason why
answers need be the same for all treaty rules. But it is essential that
the relationship between treaty and contract be certain and predictable vis-à-vis any particular treaty provision. Otherwise it becomes
extremely difficult for contracting parties to plan ex ante. To that
end, the ideal solution would be to clarify how each treaty norm
relates to contracts in the treaty text—as is done in the CISG.70
However, this would call for the amendment of thousands of
treaties. What follows is thus primarily an argument for how adjudicators ought to approach the treaty/contract issue in the face of
treaty silence. At the same time, it serves as a normative argument
for how treaty drafters might best address the issue in tomorrow’s
treaties.
In the next Part, I suggest that tribunals have varied markedly
in answering this question—usually without even considering the
issue explicitly. This irregularity poses a serious harm for both
states and investors as they seek to structure investment deals ex
ante. The cases do, however, suggest a tendency toward privileging
treaty over contract. In Part III, I argue against this tendency and
conclude that the general rule should be respect for party choice—a
baseline that best serves the interests of both investors and states.
However, I suggest that this rule must be nuanced and flexible, and
I explore the possibility that in limited instances sticky defaults and
68. See id. at 2048-49.
69. See S.I. Strong, Contractual Waivers of Investment Arbitration: Wa(i)ve of the Future?,
29 ICSID REV. 690, 691 (2014); Bart L. Smit Duijzentkunst, Of Rights and Powers: Waiving
Investment Treaty Protection, EJIL: TALK ! (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/of-rights-andpowers-waiving-investment-treaty-protection/ [https://perma.cc/H27K-QZ9P].
70. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 6.
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mandatory rules may be justifiable in light of compelling intrinsic
or extrinsic values.
II. THE TREATY/CONTRACT QUESTION IN INVESTOR-STATE
JURISPRUDENCE
This Part examines how investment tribunals have approached
the relationship between contract and treaty in practice, and how
they have justified their approaches (if at all). To illustrate the
uncertainty of the adjudicative status quo, I focus on three specific
provisions found in most treaties: forum selection, the substantive
guarantee of FET, and damages. Answers to the treaty/contract
question have been inconsistent and irregular within and across
each term. Any of these provisions may be price terms—and
potentially important ones—relating to common questions which
contracting parties regularly consider and dicker over in their
negotiations. Nevertheless, investment treaties are almost invariably silent on how their terms interact with contracts, and tribunals
have been highly inconsistent and unclear in grappling with these
questions. At most, it appears that tribunals tend to assume that
treaty rules are either mandatory or highly sticky—a tendency I
challenge directly in Part III.
A. Forum Selection
Forum selection provides the clearest example of how tribunals
have diverged on the relationship between treaty and contract. As
it happens, tribunals have given closer attention to the relationship
on this issue than in any other context. This is largely because the
leading cases have turned on a relatively uncommon investment
treaty provision known as the “umbrella clause,” which has the
effect of elevating contract claims to the level of treaty claims.71
Disputes under such clauses necessarily put the treaty/contract

71. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, ¶¶ 54-56 (Oct. 12,
2005) [hereinafter Noble Ventures]. Note that this question need not arise exclusively with
regard to the umbrella clause—it can and does arise in FET and expropriation cases as well.
See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, ¶¶ 296-303 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Gas].
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issue front and center. I discuss these controversial provisions in
further detail elsewhere.72 Suffice it to say, as generally understood,
umbrella clauses transform at least some kinds of contractual
promises between states and investors into obligations actionable
under the treaty.73 For our purposes, the issue is what happens
when those underlying contracts include exclusive forum selection
clauses, limiting jurisdiction to the national courts of the host state.
The leading cases here are SGS v. Philippines and SGS v.
Paraguay—which, conveniently, involved the same company, similar BITs, similar contracts, and similar facts. Each of the contracts
was executed under the law of the host state, and each contract provided that the local courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over
any disputes over the contracts.74 In each case, the main dispute
concerned the failure of the state to pay substantial contractual fees,
and, in each instance, the company ignored the contract’s exclusive
forum selection clause, seeking relief instead through investor-state
arbitration by appeal to Switzerland’s BIT with each host state.75
Both tribunals faced the same tension.76 On the one hand, the
umbrella clause expressly elevates contracts to the level of the
treaty, creating arbitral jurisdiction under the treaty’s dispute resolution clause. On the other hand, the contracts themselves expressly
disclaimed any jurisdiction other than that of national courts. Each
tribunal had to consider which provision controlled.
SGS v. Philippines provides a nuanced and uncommonly wellreasoned authority on the treaty/contract issue. Most importantly,
it found that the umbrella clause only imposed an international
legal obligation to perform, and converted the consequences of nonperformance into an issue of international law. In the Tribunal’s
view, the umbrella clause

72. See Arato, supra note 2, at 251-58.
73. See id.; see, e.g., Noble Ventures, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, ¶ 53.
74. See SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 34 (Feb.
12, 2010); SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 22 (Jan. 29, 2004).
75. See SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶¶ 125-176; SGS v. Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 67.
76. See SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶ 125; SGS v. Philippines, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 92.
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makes it a breach of the BIT for the host State to fail to observe
binding commitments, including contractual commitments,
which it has assumed with regard to specific investments. But
it does not convert the issue of the extent or content of such
obligations into an issue of international law.77

According to the Tribunal, the scope of these contractual commitments can only be ascertained in light of the contract’s terms, supplemented by the default and mandatory rules of the law of the
contract—that is, municipal law.78 And, where the contract provides
for an exclusive forum to resolve all contractual disputes, the
existence of a breach and the amount of damage thereby caused can
be authoritatively determined only by the contractually provided
forum.79 Forum selection is, after all, part of the deal—a price term
that could have been negotiated nonexclusively but, here, was not.
Noting that the contract provided exclusively for local court jurisdiction, the Tribunal issued a stay.80 It held the claim inadmissible
until such a time as the company submitted its claim before the
Philippines courts and the latter rendered an authoritative judgment.81 Only then would the state’s compliance become a matter of
international law.82
Six years later, SGS v. Paraguay departed from SGS v. Philippines on this issue, privileging the treaty provision providing
investors with access to investor-state arbitral jurisdiction over the
contract’s exclusive forum selection clause opting for domestic
courts.83 The Tribunal’s key assumption was that treaty and
contract could be kept wholly discrete.84 The Tribunal held that,
once covered as an investment, state contract would simultaneously
create both domestic legal rights and international legal rights
under the treaty.85 In the Tribunal’s view it had no jurisdiction over

77. SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 128.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id. ¶ 175.
81. Id.
82. See id. ¶ 128.
83. See SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 131,
138-142 (Feb. 12, 2010).
84. See id. ¶¶ 177-184.
85. See id. ¶¶ 167, 176, 181.
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the former, but it asserted full jurisdiction over the latter.86 And,
unlike SGS v. Philippines, it viewed the contract’s exclusive forum
selection clause as no bar to adjudicating the treaty claims.87 For the
Tribunal in SGS v. Paraguay, the umbrella clause required it to determine the disposition of the international legal rights generated
by the covered contract, irrespective of the disposition of the national legal rights under the municipal law of the contract.88 In its view,
even an express, exclusive forum selection clause choosing local
courts for the determination of all contractual disputes would only
affect jurisdiction over the national legal rights generated by the
contract—without affecting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over any and
all claims of breach under the treaty.89
From the ex ante perspective of the parties to an investment
contract, these cases differ markedly in their bearing on the parties’
contractual autonomy. Under the rule adopted by SGS v. Paraguay,
and others like it, treaty provisions offering investors access to investor-state arbitral jurisdiction attain something like mandatory
status.90 Even when the treaty claim at issue arises directly out of
the underlying contract, via the umbrella clause, express and exclusive contract terms on forum selection will not displace the treaty’s
provision on dispute settlement. Rather, on this view, the treaty
forum (or fora) will be available, irrespective of the parties’
arrangements—a point which would be of obvious significance to
parties negotiating contracts under the ambit of investment
treaties. The approach in cases like SGS v. Philippines, by contrast,
hews much more closely toward the arrangements negotiated by the
contracting parties.91 On this reading, treaty provisions on dispute
86. See id. ¶ 130.
87. See id. ¶ 174.
88. See id. ¶ 175 & n.104.
89. See id. ¶¶ 142, 174. Ultimately, the Tribunal ruled against the State on the
merits—finding the State responsible for several breaches of contract, rejecting its contractual
defenses, and assigning damages totaling $39 million plus interest. SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/29, Award, ¶¶ 182-184, 188 (Feb. 10, 2012).
90. For an example outside the context of the umbrella clause, see Parkerings-Compagniet
AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, ¶ 332 (Sept. 11, 2007) [hereinafter
Parkerings] (asserting a similar argument in a case turning on FET).
91. See also Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V.
v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, ¶ 142 (May 29, 2009) [hereinafter BIVAC v. Paraguay] (“Assuming that [the
umbrella clause] does import the obligations under the Contract into the BIT ... [t]his would
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resolution represent only a default, which can be contracted around
via clear express language in the contract.92
The treaty/contract issue surrounding forum selection is not limited to umbrella clause cases. It has emerged in numerous cases
invoking the standard substantive protections like expropriation
and FET, though rarely as explicitly as the SGS cases. Of these, the
very recent Crystallex Award represents an important precedent.93
Crystallex charts a clear middle ground between SGS v. Philippines and SGS v. Paraguay. This Tribunal acknowledged that it
might be possible for parties to contract out of treaty dispute resolution, but it imposed a heavy burden of clarity on any contracting
parties attempting to do so. If SGS v. Paraguay viewed treaty dispute resolution as effectively mandatory, and SGS v. Philippines
understood it as a simple default, Crystallex understood it as
something in between—a classic sticky default, which parties might
be able to contract around if they did so in just the right way. In its
words,
[E]ven if [the Tribunal] were minded to find that an investor
may waive by contract rights contained in a treaty, any such
waiver would have to be formulated in clear and specific terms:
a waiver, if and when admissible at all, is never to be lightly
admitted as it requires knowledge and intent of forgoing a right,
a conduct rather unusual in economic transactions.94

In this case, the contract contained an explicit and exclusive forum
selection clause, opting to resolve all disputes in Venezuelan
courts.95 But this, for the Tribunal, was not enough to overcome its
include not only the obligation to make payment ... [under] the Contract, but also the obligation (implicit if nothing else) to ensure that the Tribunals of the City of Asunción were
available to resolve any ‘conflict, controversy, or claim which arises from or is produced in
relation to’ the Contract.” (quoting Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Republic of Paraguay on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.Para., art. 3(4), Oct. 29, 1992, T.S. No. I-39878)).
92. See Crawford, supra note 4, at 363-64; see also GUS VAN HARTEN , SOVEREIGN CHOICES
AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 12224 (2013).
93. See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/11/2, Award (Apr. 4, 2016) [hereinafter Crystallex].
94. Id. ¶ 481.
95. See id. ¶ 482.
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presumption against an investor’s waiver of treaty fora.96 Though
waiver might be possible, even a clear contractual statement affirmatively opting for domestic courts to the exclusion of all other fora
would not do the trick. As is typically the case with sticky defaults
in domestic law, the Tribunal indicated that some special language
would be required.
Importantly, the Tribunal gave some indication of the kinds of
magic words that might make a contractual waiver effective to
displace the background treaty fora. The Tribunal noted, in the negative, that the contractual forum selection provision “makes no
mention of the Claimant’s rights under the BIT, and no reference to
the BIT in general terms or to the Claimant’s right to seek recourse
in arbitration for the alleged violation of those rights.”97 Though the
Tribunal never came out and said that such references would have
made a difference, it clarified that what it was looking for, and could
not find, were “indices that the Parties did in fact contemplate such
a set of circumstances,” and that the investor affirmatively agreed
to dispense with his right to a treaty-based forum.98
The Tribunal did not explain its rationale for viewing forum
selection as a sticky default in any great depth, but we can reverse
engineer some of its thinking from its cursory discussion of what
language might have made such a waiver effective. In finding that
an express, but general, exclusive forum selection clause was not
enough, the Crystallex Tribunal tentatively suggested that what
was missing was some express reference to the treaty as an
indication that the Parties specifically contemplated discarding
treaty arbitration. Conversely, to get around such a sticky default,
the parties would have to include language evidencing their mutual
awareness of what was being given up. As will be discussed further
in Part III, below, the justification for such a rule might be to ensure
that parties contracting under the ambit of a BIT share pertinent
information in their negotiations.99 Specifically, a sticky default of
this kind would ensure that a party seeking to foreclose investorstate dispute settlement ensures that the other party is aware of his

96.
97.
98.
99.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See Ayres, supra note 27, at 2095-98.
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right to compel international arbitration, and that the parties
consciously agreed to give it up.100
Finally, it bears noting that, at the time of litigation, the claimant’s and respondent’s interests do not always fall on the same side
of this issue. While in the above cases it was always the respondent
state invoking the contract’s exclusive forum selection clause, the
same kind of clause stymied a respondent’s efforts in Oxus Gold v.
Uzbekistan.101 There, the Tribunal ruled against the Respondent’s
attempt to bring counterclaims against the Claimant under a
contract associated with the investment, in light of a provision in
that contract vesting exclusive jurisdiction in national courts. The
Tribunal considered that the contract’s forum selection clause
“constitutes a sort of carve-out from a potential jurisdiction under
the BIT and deprives the Arbitral Tribunal of any jurisdiction over
such counterclaims.”102 As in SGS v. Philippines, the BIT dispute
resolution provision was, in the Tribunal’s view, a mere default.
Unlike in SGS v. Philippines, the Tribunal’s emphasis of the
contractual provision accrued to the Claimant’s benefit.
B. Legitimate Expectations and Stabilization
The content of substantive investment treaty standards remains
the gravitational issue in international investment law, and none
more centrally so than the vague catch-all standard guaranteeing
investors FET. The thorniest point of contention is whether it includes an obligation on states to protect an investor’s “legitimate
expectations,” and, more specifically, to what extent that includes
an obligation to compensate investors for losses arising out of
regulatory change (a duty of “stabilization”).103
Tribunals have disagreed fiercely on just how far FET entails a
guarantee of regulatory stabilization (if at all).104 To be clear, there
100. See infra Part III.C.
101. Oxus Gold PLC v. Republic of Uzb., UNCITRAL, Final Award (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Oxus], www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7238_2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QF8U-V2SE].
102. Id. ¶ 958(ii).
103. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 82-85.
104. Compare Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award,
¶¶ 260-261 (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron] (holding that FET entails a strong obligation
of legal stabilization), with Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 423
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is no need here to take a position on the debate over FET’s precise
substantive content. At issue here is a question hidden inside of the
stabilization debate: whether and to what extent the treaty standard augments contracts between host states and foreign investors,
and whether it is something that can be contracted around.
To contextualize the issue from the contracts perspective, absent
any investment treaty, stabilization is something for which parties
often can and do contract.105 Most national legal orders have special
rules for public contracts—meaning contracts with the government,
subunits of the government, or in some cases with state-owned
enterprises.106 Usually the defaults are government-friendly.107 It
would be uncommon for a national legal order to guarantee an investor against legislative change by default. In the U.S. law of
public contracts, for example, a private party is not guaranteed
against general legislative changes that diminish the value of her
contract with the government by default.108 But to the extent that
parties are sufficiently concerned about the risk of regulatory
change, they can negotiate for a stabilization clause.109 Stabilization
is, in other words, a price term—one which investors are not
entitled to by default, and which they will have to pay for. And the
same goes for transnational contracts, absent an applicable investment treaty.
The usual question in international investment law is to what
extent FET provisions impose a stabilization requirement on states

(July 8, 2016) (holding that FET entails only a weak stabilization protection against general
legislation), and Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Gov’t of Can., PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award, ¶ 502
(Mar. 24, 2016) (holding, in the context of the NAFTA, that “the failure to respect an
investor’s legitimate expectations in and of itself does not constitute a breach of [FET], but
is an element to take into account when assessing whether other components of the standard
are breached”).
105. See INT’L FIN . CORP., STABILIZATION CLAUSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4-5 (2009).
106. See generally ROBERT MELTZ, CONG . RESEARCH SERV., R42635, WHEN CONGRESSIONAL
LEGISLATION INTERFERES WITH EXISTING CONTRACTS: LEGAL ISSUES 7-9 (2012).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 9.
109. See Serkin, supra note 9, at 958. Note that such clauses are considered unconstitutional in some national legal orders, due to their potential to constrain future governments’ ability
to regulate. See id. at 886 n.27; Howard Mann, Stabilization in Investment Contracts: Rethinking the Context, Reformulating the Result, INV. TREATY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.iisd.
org/itn/2011/10/07/stabilization-in-investment-contracts-rethinking-the-context-reformulatingthe-result/ [https://perma.cc/Q44Q-HQK3].
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at all, vis-à-vis any kind of asset.110 Our question is related but conceptually independent from the issue of content. The question for us
concerns how FET operates in contract cases—specifically where the
investment is itself a negotiated agreement between the state and
foreign investor reflecting their agreed allocation of risk. Does the
treaty graft an obligation of stabilization on to such contracts? And,
if so, to what extent can the parties contract around the treaty
standard?
Notice that no such issue arises with pure property cases, in
which it poses no problem that the treaty establishes received rules
for the disposition of foreign property, binding the state over and
above its own property law. With property, the point of the treaty is
clearly to provide investor-friendly rules to attract investment.111
The only debate vis-à-vis property claims is about how far the substance of the standard extends. But in contract cases an additional
issue arises: how much to respect the parties’ own efforts to allocate
risk. Investor-state cases involving contracts have thus far tended
to debate the issue of content vigorously; but they have generally
disposed of the contracts-specific questions only on the level of
assumptions.
As Professor Dolzer notes, jurisprudence on legitimate expectations is in a state of flux.112 The case law can be usefully divided into
two lines, reflecting broad and narrow approaches to legitimate
expectations. The cases are quite a bit messier, but this simplified
division serves to illustrate the underlying treaty/contract issue.
Note at the outset that all of the cases seem to agree that normally,
in protecting expectations, FET will materially add something to
state contracts within its ambit. Clearly, the cases differ on how
much FET adds (ultimately a question of substantive content). But,
more importantly for our purposes, the cases further differ on how
much the content of FET will depend on just what the contractual
arrangements entail in particular cases—in other words, on
110. Dolzer, supra note 63, at 20-29; see also Moshe Hirsch, Between Fair and Equitable
Treatment and Stabilization Clause: Stable Legal Environment and Regulatory Change in
International Law, 12 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 783, 805-06 (2011).
111. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 19.
112. Dolzer generally supports the view that, under the legitimate expectations component
of FET, contracts should establish some stabilization duty. See Dolzer, supra note 63, at 25-26.
But see Crawford, supra note 4, at 373 (“The relevance of legitimate expectations is not a
license to arbitral tribunals to rewrite the freely negotiated terms of investment contracts.”).
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whether and how much a tribunal must dig into terms of the contract to determine just what an investor can legitimately expect.113
For one line of cases, FET contains a robust guarantee of legitimate
expectations, applicable in full to investment contracts regardless
of the underlying contractual arrangements; on the other view, FET
imposes only a narrower minimal core on investment contracts,
which may be expanded (and perhaps even constricted) by the terms
of the underlying contract.
The broad approach to legitimate expectations in contracts cases
is typified by a series of gas disputes against Argentina arising out
of the 2001-2002 financial crisis, including Sempra v. Argentina,
Enron v. Argentina, and CMS Gas v. Argentina (collectively, the Argentine Gas Cases).114 Each of these disputes arose out of regulatory
changes that severely devalued long-term gas distribution contracts
between private investors and the Argentine State.115 In the early
1990s, Argentina embarked on a comprehensive privatization
program, part of which involved designing a regulatory framework
covering the gas sector designed to attract FDI.116 The framework
included guarantees that companies could calculate rates in U.S.
dollars and convert them to pesos at the prevailing exchange rate,
to be recalculated every six months for the thirty-five-year life of the
contract.117 At the time, the peso was also pegged to the dollar.118 As
Argentina slipped into financial crisis in the l990s, the State took a
series of emergency measures altering the regulatory framework for
gas distribution: repealing the convertibility guarantees (requiring
rates to be set in pesos); converting all rates from dollars into pesos
at a rate of 1:1 (“pesification”); and subsequently devaluing the

113. I owe this important clarification to Julianne Marley.
114. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept.
28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra]; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007);
CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May 12, 2005). See generally José E. Alvarez &
Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A Glimpse into the Heart of the
Investment Regime, in THE YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY
2008/2009, at 379 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009) (discussing the decisions in the Argentine Gas
Cases).
115. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 114, at 379-88.
116. See id. at 388-89.
117. Id.
118. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 82; Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 114, at
389.
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peso.119 Needless to say, these measures severely depreciated the
value of the underlying contracts and undermined their viability as
investments.120
CMS, Sempra, and Enron each sued Argentina under the
U.S.—Argentina BIT.121 The key question in each case was whether
the treaty guaranteed the investor rights of legal stabilization beyond what was contained in the contracts—whether, in other words,
FET grafted a duty of stabilization onto the underlying contracts
between the investors and the Argentine State.122
First, each case defined FET broadly to include a duty of stabilization.123 The Tribunal in CMS Gas held that “[t]here can be no
doubt ... that a stable legal and business environment is an essential
element of fair and equitable treatment.”124 The Enron Tribunal
concurred, adding that the standard protects investor expectations
“derived from the conditions that were offered by the State to the
investor at the time of the investment [and on which the investor
relied].”125 For Enron, such “offers” are not limited to the terms of
the contract, but include the State’s regulatory regime at the time
of investment.126 In each case, the Tribunal further noted that the
stabilization component of legitimate expectations was an objective
standard—to be assessed only in light of a measure’s effects on the
investor’s bottom line, and not in light of the State’s regulatory
aims.127 Each tribunal found Argentina had violated its obligation
119. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 116; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 72;
CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 65.
120. See Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 81; CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
¶¶ 69-72.
121. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 5; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 4;
CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 4.
122. Each of these contracts included some stabilization clauses of their own, but they fell
short of the degree of stabilization being read into the treaty. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra
note 114, at 388-89, 391-92. The implicit issue here is whether the treaty clauses would afford
investors greater protection than that available under the contracts.
123. Each tribunal was careful to note that the State might not be under a total
stabilization requirement, but none clarified how far the requirement goes. See CMS Gas,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 277; see also Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 300; Enron,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 261.
124. CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 274.
125. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 262 (footnote omitted).
126. See id. ¶ 264.
127. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 304; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
¶ 268; CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶¶ 280-281.
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to provide FET. As the Enron Tribunal stated, “[t]he measures in
question ... have beyond any doubt substantially changed the legal
and business framework under which the investment was decided
and implemented.”128
What is hardly discussed in any of these cases is the relationship
between FET and the underlying contracts, or the extent to which
the tribunals’ interpretations of the standard affect the contractual
arrangement. Much like SGS v. Paraguay, Sempra merely waves
the question away formalistically. According to the Sempra Tribunal, treaty claims and contract claims can be neatly separated.129 In
its view, the FET claim involves only the treaty, not the contract,
because it arises out of the state’s legislative action and is not
exclusively and merely a commercial dispute about the contract—as
if such things can be neatly separated.130 Materially, on this view,
FET protects investors’ expectations to the same degree, no matter
how they choose to invest; if the investment is structured through
a contract, the treaty standard simply supplements that contract.
In other words, the tribunals treat the contracts as generic assets,
which are subject to additional treaty protections like “legitimate
expectations” under FET on the pure property model.
If, however, we change our perspective to the point of view of the
parties negotiating such a contract ex ante, it becomes clear that
any such background rule must be considered as materially part of
the deal. Where stabilization is permissible in national law at all,
its presence or absence becomes a price term like any other. The
assumption in the Argentine Gas Cases is that the treaty creates a
background norm requiring the state to afford investors a degree of
legal stabilization, whether or not they specifically negotiate a stabilization clause. At a minimum, on this interpretation of FET, stabilization becomes a default rule applying in contractual relations
between states and foreign investors, regardless of whether or not
the law of the contract includes any such principle. While it is not
entirely clear whether this treaty-based default is something the
parties could have expressly contracted around, the tribunals’ strict

128. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 264.
129. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 310.
130. See id. ¶¶ 99-101.
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separation of treaty and contract implies that the full measure of
legitimate expectations under FET is effectively mandatory.
Another line of cases—typified by Parkerings v. Lithuania—presents a far narrower approach to FET in contract cases.131 Parkerings concerned a 1999 contract between Parkerings, a Norwegian
Company, and the municipality of Vilnius for the creation, operation, and enforcement of a new public parking system in the city.132
The company was to retain, for a period of thirteen years, the rights
to collect parking fees and to enforce the system through clamping
delinquent cars and imposing fines.133 Less than one year into the
contract, however, the national government began taking measures
that undercut Parkerings’s rights under the contract—including the
passage of national legislation that prohibited private companies
from collecting parking fees and enforcing violations.134 Lithuania
eventually terminated the contract, and Parkerings sued the State
under the Norway—Lithuania BIT.135
Parkerings claimed that Lithuania violated FET by frustrating
the company’s legitimate expectations.136 The Tribunal was, however, fairly circumspect in its view of the treaty standard. In particular, the Tribunal found that a contract does not, of itself, give rise to
expectations actionable under FET—nor does it create an obligation
on states to stabilize their laws vis-à-vis the investor.137 The
Tribunal emphasized that a “State has the right to enact, modify or
cancel a law at its own discretion,” as a corollary to its “sovereign
legislative power.”138 To the extent that FET entails any protection
of an investor’s expectations, no investor could legitimately expect
that signing a contract with a state would entail a tacit promise of

131. See Parkerings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award (Sept. 11, 2007); see also EDF Servs.
Ltd. v. Rom., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 217 (Oct. 8, 2009) [hereinafter EDF]
(objecting to the idea that FET might mean “the virtual freezing of the legal regulation of
economic activities, in contrast with the State’s normal regulatory power and the evolutionary
character of economic life”).
132. Parkerings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, ¶ 82.
133. Id. ¶ 84.
134. Id. ¶ 328.
135. Id. ¶¶ 195, 201, 234.
136. See id. ¶¶ 196-197.
137. See id. ¶¶ 337-338.
138. See id. ¶ 332.
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stabilization. To the contrary, the Tribunal stated that “any
businessman or investor knows that laws will evolve over time.”139
Importantly, the Tribunal focused on the deal as actually negotiated by the parties, emphasizing in particular the absence of a
stabilization clause in the underlying contract.140 As the Tribunal
pointed out, in contract it is up to the parties themselves to allocate
risk as they see fit.141 If an investor wants to reduce risk, she “must
anticipate that the circumstances could change, and thus structure
[her] investment in order to adapt it to the potential changes of legal
environment.”142 The Tribunal rightly analyzed expectations in
terms of the parties’ own risk allocation. Parkerings “could (and
with hindsight should) have sought to protect its legitimate expectations by introducing into the investment agreement a stabilisation
clause ... protecting it against unexpected and unwelcome changes.”143 If grounded in an express commitment in the underlying
contract, it might indeed become legitimate to expect such stabilization for purposes of FET.144 But, crucially, Parkerings would have
had to pay for such a right, likely yielding a less attractive
deal—assuming the state would have agreed at all. The Tribunal
thus held, “By deciding to invest notwithstanding this possible
instability, the Claimant took the business risk to be faced with
changes of laws possibly or even likely to be detrimental to its
investment.”145
Nevertheless, the Tribunal did not entirely limit the effect of FET
in contract cases. It considered that the treaty does impose a residual requirement on the state to refrain from exercising its legislative power “unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably” to the detriment
of its private contracting partners.146 But it viewed this condition
minimally and found no evidence that Lithuania ran afoul of its
139. Id.
140. See id. ¶¶ 334-338.
141. See id.
142. Id. ¶ 333.
143. Id. ¶ 336.
144. See id. ¶ 332.
145. Id. ¶ 336; see also EDF, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 217 (Oct. 8, 2009)
(“Except where specific promises or representations are made by the State to the investor, the
latter may not rely on a bilateral investment treaty as a kind of insurance policy against the
risk of any changes in the host State’s legal and economic framework.”).
146. Parkerings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, ¶ 332.
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obligations under the BIT.147 In other words, for the Tribunal, FET
imposes certain minimum levels of treatment on contracts, though
the treaty standard’s protection of legitimate expectations can be
ratcheted up where the contract itself contains specific commitments like a stabilization clause or other heightened guarantee.148
Left open is the borderline question of whether even the minimal
vision of FET could be ratcheted down by the contracting parties by
sufficiently explicit waiver. Nothing in the Tribunal’s reasoning
excludes the possibility that such conditions are themselves mere
defaults (or sticky defaults). Ultimately, the line between the
contents of FET and the treaty/contract question remains muddy.
What is clear is that, for this line of cases, the content of an investor’s legitimate expectations in contract cases depends mightily on
what the state and foreign investor worked out in their deal.
The two lines of cases discussed above diverge sharply as to the
content of legitimate expectations in FET. CMS Gas, Enron, and
Sempra contemplate an objective test with strong stabilization
effects.149 Parkerings and its ilk contemplate a much more minimal
test of fairness and reasonableness that is not based purely on the
material effects of legislative change.150 But they also differ on the
separate issue of the relationship between treaty and contract.
Abstracting from the substantive content of FET, both lines of cases
seem to assume the treaty standard represents a background rule
against which all contracting takes place. But they differ on whether and to what extent the underlying deal is relevant to determining
just what the guarantee of legitimate expectations might entail. The
implication of the Argentine Gas Cases is that legitimate expectations is comprehensive and effectively mandatory.

147. See id. ¶¶ 336-338.
148. See id. ¶ 332; see also EDF, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, ¶ 217; Philip Morris v.
Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 423 (July 8, 2016) (“[C]hanges to general
legislation (at least in the absence of a stabilization clause) are not prevented by the fair and
equitable treatment standard if they do not exceed the exercise of the host State’s normal
regulatory power ... and do not modify the regulatory framework relied upon by the investor
at the time of its investment ‘outside of the acceptable margin of change.’” (quoting Claimants’
Memorial on the Merits ¶ 243, Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7)).
149. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 304 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 268 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, ¶¶ 280-281 (May 12, 2005).
150. See Parkerings, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, ¶¶ 336-338.
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This is particularly clear in Sempra, which, like SGS v. Paraguay,
forcefully frames FET as a treaty obligation totally distinct and
severable from the contract—one which applies in full force on top
of any investment contract, regardless of what the contract says.151
By contrast, the implication of Parkerings and its ilk is that FET’s
contents depend mightily on what the contracting parties actually
agreed. On this reading, FET includes a minimal core, but it clearly
acts as a kind of default—it can be ratcheted up by the contracting
parties and arguably even watered down.
For analytical purposes I have tried to keep separate the question
of FET’s content and that of its relationship to investment contracts.
However, it bears noting that in the real world—the world actually
lived by parties engaged in negotiating investment projects— these
questions surely interrelate. Indeed, the content of the FET standard will turn out to matter quite a bit, from the perspective of
contract theory, when we turn to the normative question of how adjudicators ought to resolve the treaty/contract question.152 If FET is
an extremely robust standard of protection incorporating a stabilization requirement, then it will be critical to the state (and arguably to investors) to be able to contract around it. However, the sting
of the problem dissipates as the interpretation of FET narrows.
Even if the core of FET is mandatory with respect to contracts, but
limited to something like a guarantee that the state will use its
sovereign powers in good faith, its consequences would be far less
intrusive.
C. Damages
The realm of potential interactions between treaty and contract
on questions of substantive law goes well beyond standards of treatment like FET and expropriation. Indeed, investment treaties create
fulsome regimes of background rules which, if applicable, would
151. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 296-304. This formalistic recitation
obscures the material relationship between these instruments. From the point of view of two
contracting parties negotiating ex ante, the question of whether their deal will create a stabilization obligation for the state by triggering a treaty obligation will absolutely bear on the
material meaning of the contract. If known and understood, it would be viewed as an implied
price term that obviously affects the allocation of risk.
152. See infra Part III.
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cover most aspects of the life of the contract. Of these, rules on the
measure and calculation of damages are among the most important.
All contracts entail rules on damages—either in their express
terms, or by default under the law of the contract. Often, in national
legal orders, contracts with the state are not automatically subject
to the fullest measure of expectation damages. In such instances,
where the government opts to breach, investors are typically
entitled to some lesser measure—like recuperation of reasonable
reliance damages.153 The rationale is typically an entrenchment
concern about regulatory autonomy and the possibility of chill—a
worry that one government might tie the hands of future governments through privatization contracts.154 By contrast, the usual
measure of damages in international investment law is, today, fair
market value (FMV).155 In cases involving the expropriation of
property, FMV is typically measured in terms of the present value
of the asset, taking into account its capacity to generate income over
time.156 Applied to contracts, this measure of damages is more or
less equivalent to expectation damages. If the law of the contract
calls for mere reliance damages by default, but the investment
treaty calls for FMV, which controls? And what happens when the
parties explicitly negotiate for a particular measure of damages, say
in a liquidated damages clause? Here again, the cases display
significant variation without much outright discussion of the issue.
Notably, investment treaties do not usually include express,
general provisions on damages applicable to each and every treaty
standard.157 Typically, provisions on expropriation do include language on compensation—usually invoking FMV.158 But standards
like FET tend to be laconic on the issue, leaving much up to the
adjudicator’s discretion.159 Suffice it to note, for present purposes,
153. See Serkin, supra note 9, at 916; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Government Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 AM . L. & ECON . REV. 313, 316 (1999).
154. See Serkin, supra note 9, at 894-96; see also Arato, supra note 2, at 273.
155. See Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept.
13).
156. See, e.g., id.
157. See Pierre-Yves Tschanz & Jorge E. Viñuales, Compensation for Non-Expropriatory
Breaches of International Investment Law: The Contribution of the Argentine Awards, 26 J.
INT’L ARB. 729, 729-30 (2009).
158. See SERGEY RIPINSKY & KEVIN WILLIAMS, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 78-79 (2008).
159. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 114, at 404-05; Tschanz & Viñuales, supra note
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that the tendency is to read FET in light of customary international
law principles of compensation applicable in relations between
states, which ultimately means FMV.160
Some cases simply assume that, once a treaty breach is involved,
damages must be assessed under international law principles. CMS
Gas, Sempra, and Enron are typical in this regard. Again, these Tribunals each found Argentina in breach of FET for enacting emergency measures that severely diminished the value of the investors’
contracts.161 Once these Tribunals determined that the state had violated FET, they simply assumed that the appropriate measure of
damages was to be drawn from international law—meaning, in their
view, FMV.162 Under that rubric, the Tribunals measured each
private party’s losses in light of expected future earning potential
over the thirty-five-year life of the contract, calculated via discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis—which amounts to a sophisticated approach to expectation damages in the context of long-term
investment contracts.163
While each of the Enron, Sempra, and CMS Gas Tribunals took
pains to explain why FMV was the appropriate measure for assessing violations of FET as a matter of international law, none even
considered whether international law was the right place to look in
cases arising out of contracts. None examined whether the appropriate measure of damages might rather be found in the underlying
contract over which the claim arose—either in its express terms or
in the default rules of the law of the contract (Argentine law in each
case). They simply took as a given that international law supplied
the answer.164 Under this rule, contracting parties would have to
157, at 733.
160. See Alvarez & Khamsi, supra note 114, at 405; Tschanz & Viñuales, supra note 157,
at 735.
161. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 304 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶ 268 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, ¶ 281 (May 12, 2005).
162. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶¶ 400-403; Enron, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, ¶¶ 359-363; CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 410.
163. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 416; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
¶¶ 384-385; CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, ¶ 411.
164. A similar issue regarding investment contracts and FMV arose in ExxonMobil v.
Venezuela and ConocoPhillips v. Venezuela. See Venez. Holdings B.V. v. Bolivarian Republic
of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Award (Oct. 9, 2014) [hereinafter ExxonMobil];
ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits (Sept. 3,
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assume, ex ante, that investment treaties displace domestic contract
law on the question of damages in FET (and expropriation) cases,
establishing expectation damages as the new background rule. And,
while it is not entirely clear how sticky such a rule might be, from
the way these tribunals formalistically severed treaty and contract,
the strong implication is that expectation damages qua FMV should
be understood as effectively mandatory.165 It seems unlikely that
these tribunals would have been swayed by even express contractual provisions on damages.166
Other tribunals have taken a more nuanced approach to damages
in disputes arising out of investment contracts, more mindful of the
parties’ underlying contractual arrangements. Kardassopoulos v.
Georgia addressed the issue in particularly clear dicta. Seemingly
echoing the Argentine Gas Cases, the Kardassopoulos Tribunal
noted that the claims were treaty-based—grounded in violations of

2013). These cases involved similar underlying oil contracts, which contained specific clauses
limiting contractual damages. ExxonMobil, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, ¶ 61; ConocoPhillips,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, ¶¶ 375-376. In these cases, the contracts were between investors
and state-owned entities. Like the Argentine Gas Cases, the ExxonMobil Tribunal held that
the appropriate damages rule under the applicable BIT was FMV (for an expropriation claim).
It ignored, and thereby effectively displaced, the contractual limitations on compensation
explicitly incorporated in the contract—finding those limitations opposable only to the stateowned entity that was formally party to the contract, and not the State itself. ExxonMobil,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, ¶ 373. The issue has yet to be addressed fully by the Tribunal in
ConocoPhillips (the Tribunal has yet to rule on damages at time of writing). Yet, Arbitrator
Georges Abi-Saab raised the issue preemptively in a dissent to the Decision on Jurisdiction
and Merits (prior to his resigning from the tribunal for health reasons). See ConocoPhillips,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab to Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits (Feb. 19, 2015). In Abi-Saab’s view, even if the treaty imposes an FMV standard, any express limitations on profits must be considered in assessing the contract’s fair
market value for purposes of assessing compensation or damages. Id. ¶ 34 (“[T]he calculation
of the market value of the nationalized investment in casu—consisting of contractual rights
... has necessarily to take into account (i.e., to pass by or be filtered through) the compensation
clauses of these Agreements which quantify and limit those rights protected by the BIT.”). In
other words, for Abi-Saab, FMV cannot act to impose a measure of expectation damages blind
to express provisions in the contract that limit compensation, because that would overstate
the contract’s value on the open market. Crucially, he explains that this conclusion rests “not
only on legal, but also on economic grounds.” Id. ¶ 35. Futher, he explains “how can any homo
economicus exercising rational choice as a ‘willing buyer’ of ConocoPhillips shares or contractual rights in the Strategic Association Agreements, calculate the price he would be willing
to pay, without factoring in (or taking into account) the terms of the compensation clauses of
the Agreements?” Id. ¶ 37.
165. See, e.g., Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 401.
166. See, e.g., ExxonMobil, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, ¶¶ 61, 373.
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FET and expropriation.167 As a result, for the Tribunal, “the relevant
provisions for the purpose of both liability and quantum are contained in the treaties and, more broadly, international law”168—
which, for both claims, turned out to be FMV.169 However, the Tribunal did not treat the separation between treaty and contract as
entirely strict. It noted that its “finding is without prejudice to a
host State and an investor’s ability to contractually limit the compensation which may be owed following an expropriation where a
treaty is also in play.”170 The Tribunal added that it would be “loathe
to accept the categorical denial of such an arrangement ... as a
matter of law.”171 Clearly, in its view, the treaty rule on damages is
only a default.
Going further, the Tribunal began to consider how informed
parties might contract around a treaty on questions of damages—
asking, in other words, how sticky the treaty default might be. The
Tribunal drew attention to an exchange with the Claimants at oral
argument, where the latter hesitantly acknowledged that investors
and governments could contract around an investment treaty
through a clear liquidated damages clause or other cap on damages.172 One of the arbitrators (Vaughn Lowe) pressed the Claimants
on this point, asking the crucial question of what such a clause
would look like if the parties intended to contract around the
treaty.173 The Claimants responded that to validly contract out, the
clause “would [have to] say, ‘notwithstanding article 11 of the Energy Charter Treaty, the parties hereby agree that’, or it would say,
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of public international law.’”174 The
Claimants’ point was similar to that of the Crystallex Tribunal in
the context of forum selection: that contracting out would be possible if the contractual language indicated both parties’ awareness of
167. Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georg., ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15,
Award, ¶¶ 480-481 (Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter Kardassopoulous].
168. Id. ¶ 480.
169. See id. ¶¶ 501-504, 533-534.
170. Id. ¶ 481.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. See id. (discussing Hearing Transcript at 71-75, Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos.
ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15 (Mar. 3, 2010)).
174. Id. (quoting Hearing Transcript at 71-75, Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18
& ARB/07/15 (Mar. 3, 2010)).
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the existence of the relevant treaty standards.175 Put in contracttheoretical terms, on the Claimants’ understanding, the treaty rules
on damages would thus represent a fairly sticky default, whose
stickiness would be justified on an information-sharing rationale.176
Ultimately, however, Kardassopoulos did not decide the issue. In
the end the Tribunal did not inquire into whether the contract or
treaty took precedence in this case because it determined that the
question would make no material difference.177 In view of the particular stabilization clauses in the underlying contract, the Tribunal
considered that “the result would be the same as the application of
international law principles of compensation.”178 The Tribunal thus
disposed of the damages issue under the FMV principles of the
relevant treaties.
From the ex ante contracting perspective, the Argentine Gas
Cases and Kardassopoulos offer two competing answers to the
treaty/contract issue. Each of these cases accepts that FMV reflects
the correct approach to damages under FET (meaning expectation
damages in contract cases). However, the former cases simply
assume that a violation of FET invokes the international law standard of damages, whatever the contract (or law of the contract)
provides.179 Kardassopoulos, by contrast, acknowledges that the contracting parties can control damages in their own arrangements if
they do so expressly.180 From the contracting perspective, the former
approach positions treaty damages as something like a mandatory
background rule. The latter rather understands treaty damages as
a default—leaving it unclear just how sticky a default it might be.181

175. Compare id., with Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 482 (Apr. 4,
2016).
176. The Kardassopoulos discussion is exceptionally helpful analytically because, like
Crystallex, it raises the all important question of how a sticky default might be contracted
around—a point even domestic courts frequently elide, but which strongly tests the rationale
behind the rule’s stickiness. See Ayres, supra note 27, at 2092-96.
177. See Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, ¶ 483.
178. Id. ¶ 482.
179. See Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 400-403 (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 359-363 (May 27, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 410 (May 12, 2005).
180. See Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, ¶¶ 480-481.
181. See id. ¶¶ 480-482.
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D. Jurisprudential Uncertainty
The jurisprudence on the treaty/contract issue lies in disarray.
The question is handled irregularly within and across all treaty
issues, from forum selection to substantive obligations and damages. Such uncertainty is a real problem in private law. From the ex
ante perspective, states and foreign investors cannot be confident
about the meaning of any contract they ultimately adopt. Will the
contract be augmented by the background norms set by an applicable investment treaty? If so, are such provisions mandatory, or are
they subject to negotiation—can the parties opt out of treaty arrangements if they prefer to allocate risk in a different way? And,
if the treaty rules are mere defaults, how sticky are they? Must
parties do anything specific to contract around their parameters, to
ensure that tribunals give force to their choices? The cases give
wildly different answers to these questions, typically without much
explanation.182 Such uncertainty is problematic, to say the least, in
the sensitive realm of high risk, high value foreign investment projects—where it can strongly affect the state’s regulatory capacities
and where disputes often turn into “bet-the-company” cases.
As a first step, it is essential to see how tribunals’ implicit choices
affect investment contracts, and what they mean for future
contractual negotiations between states and foreign investors. It is
crucial, in this regard, to get past the formalistic idea that treaty
and contract claims are on purely separate tracks. Treaty and
contract cannot be neatly separated. In Crawford’s words, “treaties
and contracts are different things. But they are not clean different
things ... between them there is no great gulf fixed.”183 And as
Arbitrator Abi-Saab puts it, to simply “assert ... that the treaty
applies, without taking into consideration the terms of the contract,
amounts to revising and rewriting the contract.”184 Taking the ex
ante perspective of states and foreign investors—as contracting
182. Only a handful of cases address the treaty/contract issue directly. See, e.g., Crystallex,
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶¶ 481-482 (Apr. 4, 2016); Kardassopoulos, ICSID
Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, ¶ 211; SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 92 (Jan. 29, 2004).
183. Crawford, supra note 4, at 373.
184. ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Dissenting Opinion of Georges Abi-Saab
to Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits, ¶ 29 (Feb. 19, 2015).
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parties—helps to clarify how these messy interactions might be
better harmonized.
Under most interpretations, where a treaty claim arises out of a
contract dispute, the treaty adds (or can add) something to the contract—whether a heightened standard of treatment under FET, a
new measure of damages, or access to international fora. Cases like
SGS v. Paraguay and the Argentine Gas Cases insist that these
additions arise purely out of the treaty and are completely separate
from the contract.185 But this reasoning is overly formalistic—focused too much on the general relationship between international and
national sources of law, and not enough on the private law logic of
those very contracts the treaty seeks to protect.186
From the ex ante perspective of the parties to an investment
contract, the strict separation refrain only obscures the treaty’s
material, economic effect on the contract. Formalities aside, if the
contracting parties are aware that an overarching treaty will add to
or alter their bargain, they will have to consider such alterations
materially part of the deal. From their point of view, the treaty
creates a fairly comprehensive set of background rules supplementing their arrangements. Parties with any sophistication will have to
price these norms into their contract, or weigh whether to contract
around them.
From this vantage point, it becomes clear how much it matters
how we think about these background norms—a point distinct from
the content of the treaty provisions, and obscured by the neat separation of treaty claims from contract claims. If, as in the strict
separation logic, an investor’s treaty rights cannot be affected or
185. See, e.g., Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶ 310 (Sept. 28, 2007); see also
supra notes 83-89, 129-30 and accompanying text.
186. Contrast this to the logic of the CISG, as an international treaty which clearly seeks
to erect international background rules to govern transnational sales contracts, but which
explicitly allows private nonstate actors to contract around its terms. See CISG, supra note
3, art. 6. Nothing about the general relationship between international law and national law
prevents an international treaty from envisioning—even encouraging—private parties to opt
out through their transnational contracts. To the contrary, enshrining the capacity to opt out
is one of the CISG’s central features. Though investment treaties differ from the CISG in their
silence on this issue, it is important to see how nothing about the general relationship between international and national law bars treaties from establishing a more integrated
approach oriented toward private-party choice. The real question tribunals should be asking
is what kind of relationship, between treaty and contract, BITs envision, interpreted in light
of their object and purpose to protect and promote foreign direct investment.
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disclaimed by the terms of the contract, then the treaty provisions
act as mandatory investment protections and cramp the parties’ ex
ante ability to efficiently allocate risk. But if the treaty rules are
defaults, as in the reading of Kardassopoulos, Crystallex, and SGS
v. Philippines, the parties may then dicker over them in their negotiations as they would with any other price term.187 On this reading,
the treaty may well change the baseline for negotiations by supplanting potentially more lenient default structures in the national
law of the contract, perhaps putting the state more on the back foot.
But the parties will still be able to negotiate over the ultimate
allocation of risk and reward.
It matters how investment treaties interact with contracts, and
it is troubling that on this issue the cases have been irregular,
inconsistent, and often markedly unclear.188 There do seem to be
trends. Tribunals apparently tend more toward making assumptions that render investment treaty provisions effectively mandatory, as in the Argentine Gas Cases and SGS v. Paraguay.189 But a
significant minority of tribunals have taken party choice in contract
more seriously, viewing investment treaties as defaults of varying
degrees of stickiness. As in Kardassopoulos and Crystallex, some
tribunals have viewed treaty provisions as highly sticky defaults,
which apply unless the contracting parties opt out with exceedingly
clear and specific language.190 And a handful of others buck the
trend even further, as in SGS v. Philippines and Oxus, viewing treaty provisions as simple default rules, wholly subject to contracting
party choice.191 These variations are not limited to any particular
187. See, e.g., Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, ¶¶ 216-223; see
also supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
188. Compare SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on
Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 134 (Jan. 29, 2004) (viewing treaty dispute resolution provisions
as defaults), with Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 482 (Apr. 4, 2016)
(viewing treaty dispute resolution provisions as highly sticky defaults), and SGS v. Paraguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 138-142 (Feb. 12, 2010) (viewing
treaty dispute resolution provisions as mandatory).
189. See also, e.g., ExxonMobil, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Award, ¶¶ 61, 373 (Oct. 9,
2014); see also supra notes 86-88, 150 and accompanying text.
190. See Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, ¶ 482; Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case
Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, ¶ 481.
191. See SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 134; Oxus, UNCITRAL, Final
Award, ¶ 958 (Dec. 17, 2015); see also BIVAC v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 148 (May 29, 2009).
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treaty provision or issue, and they are occurring with increasing
frequency.
The main goal of this Part has been to highlight and analyze the
disorder in the case law on the interaction between treaty and contract. One normative point should, however, already be obvious. The
current state of uncertainty is hugely problematic from the ex ante
perspective of contracting parties—states and foreign investors—
who cannot be confident about the material meaning of any contractual arrangements under the shadow of an investment treaty. This
makes planning extremely difficult and expensive, as rational states
and investors will have to build insurance into their arrangements.
And it adds significant transaction costs to the contracting process.
If sufficiently well understood, such uncertainty risks seriously
chilling contractual relations between states and foreign investors—precisely the opposite of what investment treaties seek to
achieve.
The next Part shifts more fully from the descriptive to the
normative. I start from the position that certainty and consistency
of any kind would already be a boon.192 However, I argue that tribunals’ apparent tendency to privilege treaty norms over negotiated
contract provisions reflects the wrong approach from the perspective
of contract theory—in most, though perhaps not all, instances.
III. EFFICIENCY, AUTONOMY, AND THE FUNCTION OF CHOICE
Thus far I have argued that the moment investment treaties are
made to apply to contracts, they establish some kind of international law of contracts. Given that the treaties are invariably laconic
on this issue, however, it is difficult to determine just what kind of
law they create. Investment treaties clearly establish full panoplies
of substantive and procedural rules that relate to all investments in
192. Note that the problem of uncertainty is not likely to improve through arbitral action
alone, given that investment tribunals are constituted on a one-off basis with total discretion
to reinvent the wheel on this issue in each case. See Arato, supra note 2, at 289, 294. Treaty
change is necessary—either to clarify the treaty/contract relationship as is done in the CISG,
or—more radically—through instituting a centralized investment court along the lines
recently championed by the European Union. But note, on this issue, change need not be
systemic to have an important effect—it is not essential that all investment treaties change
all at once. Clarifying the treaty/contract relationship in any one treaty will have the effect
of enhancing certainty for its state parties and all covered investors. See infra Conclusion.
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some way. Their application to contracts might be fully extensive—
supplying norms ranging from breach, defenses, and damages to
forum selection. Investment treaties might also be read more narrowly, as applying to contracts more minimally than they would to
assets like real property. Likewise, these treaty rules might be read
as rigid provisions that apply over and above the parties’ choices, or
more flexibly as defaults to be contracted around. On all these
questions the treaties remain silent—and the jurisprudence has
oscillated among these possibilities, compounding the uncertainty
facing states and investors contemplating contractual relations. An
international law of contracts is gradually emerging, but its contours are yet to be defined.
This Part examines how the treaty/contract issue ought to be
approached. Contrary to arbitral tendencies, I suggest that it should
generally be presumed that explicit contractual provisions prevail
over treaty provisions as the authentic expression of the contracting
parties’ division of risk. In the first place, as a matter of treaty
interpretation under international law, a general presumption that
treaties create mere defaults is essential to the object and purpose
of these treaties—to protect and promote foreign direct investment.
There are also strong policy reasons for understanding most treaty
rules as mere defaults, grounded in both the logic of private law and
in concern for public regulatory values. But this conclusion is not an
absolute. Even on these rationales there may be reasons why, in
certain limited cases, treaty rules ought to be understood as sticky
defaults. By hypothesis, I explore the possibility that forum selection clauses and the general exceptions provisions might be justifiable candidates. It may even be that some treaty provisions ought
to be understood as mandatory. Still, crucially, I argue that these
choices must be justifiable in light of both the positive law of the
treaty and the private and public values it seeks to promote.
Especially since the nature of the treaty/contract relationship is
generally undecided in treaty text, the first touchstone for treaty
interpretation must be the investment treaty’s object and purpose.193
This entails, in most cases, the twin overarching goals of protecting

193. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S.
331, 340 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”).
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and promoting investments. Investment treaties are not solely
about endowing foreign direct investment with protections as a
matter of justice or fairness to the investors. Rather, states agree to
afford such protections in order to encourage investment, which they
view as essential drivers of development and a key component of
diversified economic health.194 If states did not want to induce
investment, they would not sign modern investment treaties.
Yet different provisions may well serve these treaties’ goals in
different ways. There is no reason to assume that answers to the
treaty/contract issue must be the same across all provisions of an
investment treaty. Neither the treaties nor customary international
law require any single generalizable approach. True, as Professor
Crawford notes, the customary conflicts rule applies in investorstate arbitration—whereby international law prevails over domestic
law in case of conflict.195 But a conflict would arise only if we assume
the treaty creates mandatory rules. As Professor Craswell explains,
a contract does not conflict with a contrary default rule in any
meaningful way, since the key function of default rules is to give
way to the choices of the parties.196 And the relationship between
international law and national law poses no particular problem in
this regard, as is clearly evident in the realm of transnational sale
of goods. The multilateral CISG is, after all, almost completely
comprised of default rules, which private actors can freely contract
around.197 The real problem in investment law is that, while the
treaties expressly apply to contracts-as-investment, they completely
fail to address how treaty and contract thus interrelate. In the absence of any other general rules of international law on point, the
issue of how contract relates to treaty must be asked anew vis-à-vis
each particular treaty, and each particular treaty provision, bearing
194. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 22, 29-30; Anne van Aaken & Tobias A.
Lehmann, Sustainable Development and International Investment Law: A Harmonious View
from Economics, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 317, 329-32
(Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013); Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent
and Limits of Investment Treaty Rights, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 380 (2015); Yackee, supra
note 12, at 398. For a more nuanced take, see José E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 17, 41-42 (2009) (rejecting a “mono-causal” explanation of why States sign
BITs, and advancing a number of important geo-political considerations in play).
195. See Crawford, supra note 4, at 353.
196. See Craswell, supra note 7, at 1.
197. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 6.
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in mind the overarching object and purpose to protect and promote
foreign direct investment. The outstanding question is whether
there might yet be some guiding principle, and, if so, where to find
it.
What is clear is that, to the extent treaties apply to contracts, the
point is in part to protect the parties’ contractual arrangements.
Certainly investment treaties are meant to provide an added level
of security to the parties’ relations. But the point is just as surely to
do so in a way that encourages contractual relations between states
and foreign investors—to better enable the parties to plan together
and allocate risk in their joint affairs—not to make planning more
difficult. From this point of view, it would be quite problematic if
treaties were to stand in the way of the parties’ ability to allocate
risk as they see fit—at least as a general matter. Bearing in mind
that treaties apply to investment contracts in order to protect the
bargain, and to promote such bargaining in the future, it stands to
reason that treaty protections should not generally denature contractual arrangements freely negotiated by states and foreign
investors. If the goals of the treaty are understood as calling for
respect for investment contracts, then it stands to reason that the
guiding principle to resolving the treaty/contract question should be
drawn from within the private law logic of contract.198
A. The Function of Choice in the Logic of Contract
It is useful to consider more closely the core conceptual difference
in the logics of contract and property, in light of the goals of investment treaties to protect and promote foreign direct investment.
With property, protection and promotion demand a certain kind of
application of the treaty rules. To act as inducements, the treaty
rules will have to impose a regular set of protections for foreignowned property. The regularity of these protections, along with the
levels of protection and the availability of an international forum
are the incentives to invest. With contracts, the situation is
different. Here, foreigners and sovereigns negotiate the risks
themselves in the first cut. They structure and govern their own
198. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 16; Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive
Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239, 254-56 (1983).
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relationships. In this context, it is no longer clear that superimposing treaty protections on the asset in question—a carefully negotiated allocation of rights, duties, and risks—will have a positive
effect on promoting investment. For the most part, ex ante, states
and investors alike will want their own choices to control. Anything
they cannot control will have to be priced into the contract. Too
much rigidity can seriously undercut the parties’ ability to reach
efficient outcomes, and too much stickiness can make the transaction costs of drafting intolerably high.
Put another way, in most instances, the closer that treaties come
to imposing property-style rules on contracts, the more pressure
they will put on the desirability of contracting in the first place. And
herein lies the problem with the current tendency among investment tribunals, who do just that when they assume that treaty
rules simply prevail over contract provisions negotiated by the parties.199 Property and contract have quite distinct organizational
logics—and only the logic of contract serves to adequately guide the
disposition of investment treaty provisions in relation to investment
contracts. In light of the objects and purposes of investment treaties,
there is good reason to distinguish between property and contract
here and to treat contract claims with quite a bit more nuance than
we have seen.
The basic organizing principle in the logic of contract is choice.
There are, of course, great debates about the ultimate value (or
values) of contract—whether it is the autonomy of the parties,200 or
a more utilitarian vision of efficiency.201 This is not the place to
wade deep into that discourse. Suffice it to say that, across all these
visions of contract, choice is ultimately fundamental. The centrality
of choice is obvious for those that emphasize autonomy and promise as the moral and legal core of contract.202 But choice has just as
199. See, e.g., SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction,
¶¶ 37-42 (Feb. 12, 2010); Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 372-373 (Sept. 28,
2007); Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 202-209 (May 27, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 115-123 (May 12, 2005).
200. See, e.g., DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 16 (manuscript at chs. 4-7); FRIED , supra note
14, at 71-73; Kraus, supra note 15, at 1611-19; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Promising, Intimate
Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 520 (2008).
201. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 552.
202. See, e.g., FRIED , supra note 14, at 71-73; Kraus, supra note 15, at 1611-19; Shiffrin,
supra note 200, at 520.
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significant a function in utilitarian theories of contract. In the law
and economics approach of scholars like Professors Schwartz and
Scott, efficiency is the central value—not autonomy—but, critically,
efficiency is left up to the market.203 Party choice is still given as
much respect as possible because, on this view, the parties are usually themselves better positioned to allocate risk efficiently than
courts or legislatures—particularly in the case of sophisticated parties engaged in commercial contracts.204 Cutting a middle path
between these classic theories, one recent and compelling account
makes choice the centerpiece. Professors Dagan and Heller’s liberal
“choice theory of contract” gives autonomy pride of place but builds
efficiency into the theory as one of the primary goods contracting
parties seek to achieve (along with community).205 This approach
usefully distinguishes between types of contracts as an important
aspect of choice. In at least some kinds of contracts, particularly
commercial contracts between sophisticated parties, efficiency is all
the parties seek to achieve—and we can assume that their choices
are oriented toward such outcomes.206 In other kinds of contracts,
values like community might be emphasized—as with marriage
contracts or nonprofit charters.207 Thinking about contracts in terms
of types may affect our assumptions about just what the parties
have chosen in particular instances and may give reason to nudge
parties one way or another through sticky defaults and mandatory
rules. But ultimately, on this theory, the point of contract law is to
prioritize choice—to make choice meaningful. The bottom line is,
whether we emphasize efficiency or autonomy and whatever values
particular parties emphasize in particular contracts, it should be
clear that choice lies at contract’s heart.
The logic of contract law is thus inextricably oriented around respect for party choice: choices about what kinds of contract to adopt,
and choices about the terms within any particular contract.208 To the
extent that investment treaties apply to contracts, they create
contract law—and this law should resonate with contract’s basic
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 21, at 618.
See id.
See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 16.
See id. (manuscript at ch. 6).
See id.
See id.
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logic. In determining the interaction between investment treaty and
state contract, the first principle should be respect for the contracting parties’ own choices—though this surely means treaties will
apply differently to contracts than other assets like real property,
or, for that matter, sovereign debt or intellectual property.209
Treaties, in other words, should not normally be used to rewrite
contractual arrangements.210 Whatever their content, the basic presumption should be that investment treaty norms apply to contracts
as no more than defaults, which the parties are free to contract
around.
B. Valuing of Choice in the Law and Policy of Foreign Direct
Investment
Beyond bringing the burgeoning investment treaty law on
contracts into greater coherence with contract theory, the choiceoriented approach advocated here offers tangible policy payoffs for
international investment law. Most debates in the field treat the
interests of states and investors as essentially zero-sum. The battle
lines tend to be drawn over how much investment treaties constrict
the state’s policy space,211 or how much they undercut its sovereign
authority.212 Too often this debate is portrayed as a conflict between
209. See Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 481 (July 8, 2016)
(recalling that trademarks are not normally insulated from regulatory interference, the
Tribunal explained that “if investors want stabilization they have to contract for it”).
210. See Crawford, supra note 4, at 373.
211. See, e.g., Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 8-10 (2014).
212. Critics have tried to reconceive international investment law in public law terms in
hopes of rebalancing the regime toward states. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von
Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State
Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 304-08 (2010) (invoking the “margin of appreciation”);
Mattias Kumm, An Empire of Capital? Transatlantic Investment Protection as the Institutionalization of Unjustified Privilege, EUR. SOC’Y INT’L L. REFLECTIONS, May 25, 2015, at 1,
4 n.2, 7 (invoking “proportionality” and “subsidiarity”); Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State
Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS HUM . RTS. 47, 76 (2010) (invoking
“proportionality”); see also Stephan W. Schill, Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Reconceptualizing the Standard of Review, 3 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577, 579-80 (2012). I am
sympathetic to public law scholars’ concern about the threat the regime poses to public values.
But I am skeptical of the too-easy invocation of national or transnational public law doctrines
as a panacea for global investment law—for both principled and contingent reasons, given
current institutional arrangements. See Julian Arato, The Margin of Appreciation in International Investment Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 545, 548-52 (2014); see also Philip Morris v. Uruguay,

2016]

CONTRACT IN THE WORLD OF INVESTMENT TREATIES

403

commercial lawyers who tend to be “investor-friendly” and “statefriendly” public lawyers—as if private law is intrinsically insensitive
to public regulatory values.213 The approach advocated here belies
this false distinction, to the benefit of states and investors alike. The
treaty/contract issue is not zero-sum. The question of whether a
treaty or contract norm gets priority does not easily divide into
“investor-friendly” and “state-friendly” approaches. At least from the
ex ante perspective, neither rigidity nor flexibility clearly favors one
party or the other. Indeed, rigidity generally undermines both sides’
interests ex ante, while flexibility is generally the optimal approach.214
The basic problem is that too much rigidity prevents states from
adequately managing the significant risks entailed in high-value
contracts with private parties—not least to their long-term regulatory autonomy. And this in turn constricts investors’ capacity to
bargain in inefficient ways. Take, for example, a typical damages
rule. It is usually understood that the proper measure of damages
for a violation of FET is FMV, which amounts to expectation
damages in contract cases.215 But the parties might want to
negotiate over contractual damages. What if the parties would
prefer to limit damages in some way? What if, for example, capping
damages turns out to be the key to achieving an optimal price—or
even to securing a deal at all?
From the state’s perspective, the stickier the FMV rule, the more
difficult it becomes for states to manage risks to their capacity to
ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Gary Born,
¶¶ 190-191 (July 8, 2016) (rejecting the majority’s transposition of the margin of appreciation
into international investment law).
213. This is assuredly not true. As this Article has sought to demonstrate in one particular
area, a nuanced approach to private law can be highly sensitive to public values. See, e.g.,
DAGAN , supra note 17. Particularly in the transnational context, the power of contract can be
highly liberating for states concerned to protect their public values.
214. Notably, even ex post, it is not clear that any particular resolution to the
treaty/contract issue will always hew toward one party or the other. Take, for example, a rule
that treaty dispute resolution clauses are mere defaults. This cut against the Claimants in
SGS v. Philippines, where the exclusive forum selection clause in the underlying contract
prevented bootstrapping the contract claims to the level of the treaty via the umbrella clause.
See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. But the same rule cut against the Respondent
in Oxus, where the Respondent was equally barred from bringing counterclaims against the
Claimant under a contract that exclusively selected domestic courts for dispute resolution. See
supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
215. See Tschanz & Viñuales, supra note 157, at 737.
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regulate in the future. High-value contracts with foreign investors
will have an unavoidable chilling effect on subsequent regulation,
which may in turn chill the prospect of contracting. This is all the
more problematic when it comes to contracts in sensitive areas like
the extractive industries or water services, which are perennially
likely to generate risks to health and environment. And the chilling
effects will be felt all the more acutely by emerging economies. With
an overly rigid rule, a rational state will have to price such risks
into their contracts.
And herein lies the problem for investors, who may well want to
shoulder more risk—or certain kinds of risk—in the hopes of securing a better price. While it may seem, at the point of litigation, that
any investor would want an investment treaty to offer as much
protection to the private party as possible, the matter has to be
assessed ex ante. If the treaty protections imposed on a contract are
too great, the state may be pushed into offering investors less attractive investment opportunities in order to insure itself, or it may
even be dissuaded from contracting under the shadow of the treaty
altogether. Such chilling effects are precisely the opposite of what
these treaties seek to achieve: the protection and promotion of
foreign direct investment.
By contrast, much of the sting of even highly investor-friendly
rules would be removed if they merely provided default baselines—
if, for example, the parties can contract around the presumption of
FMV, that is, expectation damages, inhering in the treaty. True, the
state might find itself on the back foot in contract negotiations—as
compared to negotiating a similar contract with its own national,
where the domestic law of the contract entails a lesser measure
(such as reliance damages) by default.216 But, much more importantly, the power would still lie with the contracting parties to
allocate the risks between themselves.
Prioritizing choice in investment contracts benefits the state by
enabling it to control the scope of possible future liability. Contract
represents the crucial tool for states to structure projects with
investors in ways that allocate risk at tolerable levels. To the extent
that states are concerned about the possible effects of high-value
investment contracts on their capacity to regulate in the future,
216. See Serkin, supra note 9, at 916.

2016]

CONTRACT IN THE WORLD OF INVESTMENT TREATIES

405

they ought to be able to insure against such risks in the structure
of the deal. But these strategies only mitigate risk if such contractual choices are ultimately given effect. If highly protective treaty
provisions are treated as mandatory rules, as is apparently implied
by the rigid interpretations of investment treaties espoused by cases
like CMS Gas and SGS v. Paraguay, it becomes much more difficult
for states to manage their risks ex ante. The consequences of such
a rule are not limited to regulatory chill, but also inefficient contracting and potentially contractual chill. If treaty provisions, like
a robust version of legitimate expectations or expectation damages,
are effectively mandatory, states will have to price these background norms into their deals with foreign investors in order to
insure themselves—and, in some instances, the risks might dissuade them from contracting at all. Perhaps counterintuitively, the
basic rule that contractual choices ought to be given priority over
treaty norms enhances the autonomy of the state.
The choice-oriented approach benefits investors as well. It might
seem that foreign investors would want investment treaties to
afford as much protection as possible. This would certainly appear
to be the case from a glance at any investor’s brief at the point of
litigation, when investors are often engaged in bet-the-company
cases. And it may be that, as far as assets like real property go, the
more treaty protection offered, the better the inducement to invest.
But this is not the case in contract. Ex ante, particular investors
may be happy to bargain over certain provisions. For example, an
investor may not assign high value to the availablity of international fora if she trusts the state’s national courts. To the extent
that the state party values avoiding international arbitration, the
investor should be able to offer waiving investor-state dispute
settlement to secure some other benefit. More generally, investors
may want to take on some risk—no business venture is risk free,
and in at least some cases and the appeal of foreign investment is
the possibility of taking on elevated risks in the hopes of high
rewards. As importantly, sometimes such risks can be more efficiently managed in other ways, for example through political risk
insurance.217 Investors surely want some measure of security in
217. Public and private insurers offer investors insurance against political risks. DOLZER
& SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 228-29. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
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engaging with foreign sovereigns but may not value maximizing
security at the expense of everything else. Certainly, at the least,
rational investors will want states to be able to negotiate over risk.
If treaties create rigid rules that mandate certain allocations of risk,
investors may not be able to secure the risk profile they want. If the
investor wants to shoulder some of the risk, say, by waiving arbitration or agreeing to a liquidated damages provision, she should be
able to make a meaningful offer to do so.
Finally, generally speaking, neither party would want too many
treaty provisions to be sticky, at risk of ballooning the transaction
costs of drafting. There may be some special exceptions where good
policy reasons require making certain provisions more difficult to
contract around—which I consider further below.218 But, in general,
all parties should prefer to have confidence that their choices will be
enforced without having to engage in too many drafting acrobatics.
The point is that, at least ex ante, investors and states alike
should prefer an arrangement in which the treaty enables them to
allocate risk as they see fit. The investor still gets a sizeable benefit
from these treaties, which generally put in place highly protective
provisions on breach, defenses, damages, and forum selection by
default. Thus, the State begins negotiation somewhat on the back
foot. But at the same time, the State will still be able to manage its
risk so long as the parties’ contractual choices ultimately take precedence over the background treaty norms.
C. Justifying Constraints on Choice
Insofar as investment treaties apply to contracts, their provisions
should be presumptively understood as doing so only by way of
defaults. The general rule should be that the contracting parties’
choices prevail over background treaty protections. Yet there may

is a good example. The MIGA is an international institution connected to the World Bank. See
id. It offers prospective investors an array of schemes to insure themselves against political
and regulatory risks. See id. As importantly, it acts as an important go-between facilitating
relationships between investors and states before disputes arise and in their early
stages—often obviating the need for dispute resolution. See generally Overview, MULTILATERAL INV . GUARANTEE AGENCY, www.miga.org/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/JL4D-ZZWZ].
218. See infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text.
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still be instances in which constraints on party choice might be
justifiable.
Though they differ widely in extent, most national legal orders do
incorporate some limits on contracting parties’ capacity to choose
how to structure their arrangements—partially (via sticky defaults)
or completely (via mandatory rules).219 Such constraints on party
choice are usually justified in one of two broad ways: on grounds
intrinsic to the logic of contract or on the basis of external values.
The first type of justification considers sticky defaults and mandatory rules appropriate where they serve to enhance party autonomy,
for example by putting the parties on equal footing or by correcting
for certain market failures.220 These kinds of constraints serve to
ensure the rules of the game, protect basic fairness among contracting parties, and the like. A second type of justification for constraining choice relies on extrinsic values including, classically,
mandatory rules invalidating contracts of enslavement or contracts
to commit a crime.221
The same logic might apply to the treaty/contract issue in international investment law. Although in general there are strong
reasons to allow parties to contract around treaty norms, there may
be specific instances in which it makes sense to treat a particular
treaty provision—or aspects of it—as sticky or mandatory. And as
in national law, such reasons might be either intrinsic to the logic
of contract, or extrinsic in the service of some other value.
Again, it must be borne in mind that the treaties do not clearly
resolve the matter one way or the other, in general or vis-à-vis any
of their norms. So interpreters are left to explore the issue on the
basis of principles. Given the importance of the basic principle
supporting party choice in investment contracts,222 significant caution should be exercised here. A first corollary is that any such
departure from the general rule favoring contractual choice must be
justifiable and justified—not simply assumed, as several of the cases
have been wont to do.223 Ideally, we would also expect that, in
219. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 87.
220. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 27, at 2095-96.
221. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
764-65 (1983).
222. See supra Part III.A.
223. See, e.g., Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award (Sept. 28, 2007); Enron, ICSID
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determining that a default is sticky, a tribunal would afford some
explanation of how the parties could have contracted out—for the
benefit of future contracting parties.224 A second corollary is that
there are strong reasons to limit the pool of such exceptions. The
greater the number of sticky treaty defaults, the more complicated
drafting becomes—which has an exponential effect on transaction
costs.225 There may be reasons to deviate from the general rule in
some cases, but such sticky defaults should be based on especially
compelling reasons and not be stricter than necessary.
Keeping these principles in mind, it is easier to start with the
possibility of intrinsic justifications for constraints on contractual
choice in investment treaties. The example of forum selection
clauses provides a plausible example where stickiness might be justified—though I raise it only by hypothesis here, in full recognition
that there may be countervailing reasons to limit investor-state
dispute settlement to a default rule. As discussed above, the SGS
cases reveal two distinct visions of interaction between contract and
treaty on the issue of forum selection.226 SGS v. Philippines privileges the contracting parties’ choice to exclusively select national
courts for the resolution of all disputes arising out of the contract—thereby displacing the treaty forum.227 On this view, the
treaty does not rewrite the contract.228 SGS v. Paraguay, by contrast, privileges treaty over contract.229 There, even an express
Case No. ARB/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (May
12, 2005).
224. Ayres, supra note 27, at 2055 (“[I]n deciding any contractual issue concerning defaults,
judges should presumptively provide ... contractual language that would allow future contractors to achieve the results desired by the losing party.” (emphasis omitted)); see, e.g.,
Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 482 (Apr. 4, 2016) (suggesting that a contractual exclusive forum selection clause will only be effective to waive treaty arbitration if
it mentions the investment treaty by name).
225. See Ayres, supra note 27, at 2055.
226. See SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 128129 (Feb. 12, 2010); SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal
on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 139-143 (Jan. 29, 2004).
227. See SGS v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, ¶ 143; accord BIVAC v. Paraguay,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 152 (May
29, 2009).
228. Crawford, supra note 4, at 374. Crawford, incidentally, chaired the SGS v. Philippines
tribunal. See ConocoPhillips, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30, Dissenting Opinion of Georges AbiSaab to Decision on Jurisdiction and Merits (Feb. 19, 2015).
229. See SGS v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, ¶¶ 128-129.
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clause exclusively selecting national courts does not waive the investor’s right to international arbitration under the treaty.230 On
this view, from the ex ante perspective, the treaty provisions must
be understood as effectively mandatory. As argued above, the SGS
v. Paraguay interpretation rests on a faulty premise that treaty and
contract are radically separate, which should be discarded.231 There
is no good reason why fully informed and sophisticated investors
and sovereign states should not be able to structure their investments around treaty jurisdiction. Indeed, investors may well want
to disclaim such rights if doing so can fetch them a better price—
especially if they are sufficiently confident in the national courts.
But that does not mean such a provision should be easy to contract
around.
Though treaty provisions on international dispute resolution
should certainly be understood as defaults, there may be reason to
treat them as relatively sticky. The argument would start by
recalling that investment treaties are international agreements
between states to reciprocally protect one another’s nationals.232 Yet
there is real concern about whether investors are fully aware of
their treaty rights in making the decision to invest abroad—indeed,
the empirical evidence shows that, with the exception of repeat
players in certain fields, like oil and gas, investors are often not
aware that they might be empowered to compel a host state into
international arbitration.233 Arguably, states have an interest in
preserving their nationals’ access to treaty fora when they invest
abroad whether they know it or not. The argument would stress that
the goal of protecting and promoting foreign direct investment is not
just to induce private actors to invest, but also to de-escalate
disputes between sovereigns over their treatment of one another’s
nationals. By letting investors press their own claims directly,
investment treaties free home states from the responsibility of
espousing their aggrieved nationals’ claims against foreign host
states, and further free them from resolving such disputes through
self-help countermeasures. But at the same time, these interests
may not be absolute. States may be perfectly happy for their
230.
231.
232.
233.

See id. ¶¶ 125, 128-129.
See supra Part II.D.
See Yackee, supra note 12, at 398.
See id. at 400.
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nationals to intentionally negotiate over access to investor-state
dispute settlement, in hopes of securing a better price. The states’
interest in preserving their nationals’ access to arbitration may thus
be outweighed by an interest in efficiency where states can be sure
their investors are negotiating in full knowledge of their treaty
rights. It might be that the real issue is thus ensuring that investors
have access to adequate information in negotiating over dispute
settlement fora. If so, then there may be cause to push states to
convey information to putative investors about their default rights
to treaty fora, where they may not otherwise be aware of what they
are giving up.
If such concerns about information asymmetries were sufficiently
compelling, treaty provisions on dispute resolution might justifiably
act as a sticky default. The function of constraining choice, here,
would be to force states to convey information about treaty rights to
foreign investors—as apparently envisioned by the Tribunal in
Crystallex.234 Fully informed contracting parties could still get
around such a clause, but only by including language evidencing
that all sides were sufficiently informed. On this view, even the
following clause might not suffice: “all disputes shall be resolved
exclusively before the courts of [x country].” Though expressly
exclusive, such a clause would not guarantee against the relevant
information asymmetries. On this view, to contract around the
treaty, states would have to ensure that the contractual clause put
the investor on sufficient notice, for example by stating “notwithstanding the [BIT],” or “notwithstanding the existence of any
international fora.”235 Such clauses would ensure that the investor
had been aware of her rights and was thus satisfied with the
contract’s reallocation of risks.

234. See Crystallex, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/2, Award, ¶ 482 (Apr. 4, 2016).
235. See, e.g., id. In another instance, Colombia contemplated this sort of reasoning in a
2014 draft concession contract, which sought to waive “investment arbitration contemplated
in any [BIT] or other international treaty.” Contrato de Concesión Bajo el Esquema de App
No. [*] de [*]” [Model Agreement] (Colom.), translated in Strong, supra note 69, at 692. As an
aside, it would be wiser for the state to opt for a more general waiver clause, rather than
mentioning any particular BIT by name, because arbitral jurisprudence generally allows
corporate investors to change their nationality to access myriad treaties with relative
ease—even after executing the contract. See Arato, supra note 2, at 275-76.
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Notice that this account is also similar to the Claimants’ argument in Kardassopoulos, on the question of liquidated damages.236
In my view, however, stickiness makes less sense in that context.
Sophisticated commercial parties can be presumed to be sufficiently
well versed in the different measures of damages available, and how
to negotiate over damages, reducing concerns about information
asymmetries considerably. For example, there is little reason to
worry about whether foreign investors would not be aware of the
precise meaning of a damages cap—whether or not they knew of the
existence of the treaty. And there is good reason to limit stickiness
in investment treaties. Though forum-selection might be a special
case, there is generally not sufficient reason to question the
substantive deal between the parties. Conversely, going too far with
insisting that particular treaty provisions ought to be sticky would
have the perverse effect of ballooning drafting costs unnecessarily,
by forcing the parties to disclaim the treaty by name any time they
expect a contractual provision to deviate from its terms.
There may indeed be compelling reasons for viewing treaty
provisions on forum selection as sticky defaults. International dispute resolution by nonnational arbitrators is, after all, the central
structural innovation of the investment treaty regime—on which all
confidence in the application of other treaty standards is based and
on which the key enforcement mechanisms rely.237 Given its structural and institutional functions, there are arguably special reasons
to ensure that parties are sufficiently aware of what they are giving
up—which may justify stickiness in this limited context. But this
rationale should not be taken too far vis-à-vis other treaty standards.
And what of extrinsic values? It is possible that some treaty rules
might be justifiably considered sticky, or made sticky, for reasons
wholly external to the logic of contract—for example, in the service
of protecting the state’s capacity to engage in environmental or
public health regulation. A rationale for stickiness, in such contexts,
236. See Kardassopoulos, ICSID Case Nos. ARB/05/18 & ARB/07/15, Award, ¶ 481 (Mar.
3, 2010).
237. The status of investor-state judgments as international arbitral awards links them to
extremely powerful mechanisms for the enforcement like the New York Convention on foreign
arbitral awards—allowing investors to effectively pursue delinquent states’ assets across the
globe. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 6, at 310.
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would involve a classic concern about agency costs. The point is best
expressed through a hypothetical. The state’s capacity to regulate
in the public interest is an omnipresent controversy in international
investment law. Investment treaties tend not to include general
exceptions provisions granting states carve-outs for bona fide
regulation in the public interest.238 But occasionally, such clauses
appear, typically modelled on the WTO General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).239 For example, the 2012 Canada—China
BIT provides a long list of carve-outs on the model of GATT Article
XX, covering, inter alia, regulation in the interest of protecting public health, the environment, public morals, and more.240
Imagine a hypothetical investment treaty on this model, which
includes a typical FET protection, along with a clause modeled on
GATT Article XX, exempting the state from liability for any measures necessary to secure public health, environmental protection,
and public morals. An investor negotiates and executes a contract
to explore dolomite in the state with a relatively low-level official in
the ministry of finance (or even a representative of a state-owned
entity). Assume the contract includes a robust stabilization clause,
guaranteeing the investor full compensation for any subsequent
regulation that undermines the value of the contract. A year later,
the legislature passes sweeping environmental reforms that reduce
the investor’s future profitability by 60 percent, and the investor
brings suit under the Treaty. Can the State take advantage of the
exceptions clause, or does the contract’s stabilization clause prevail
over the State’s treaty protection? In other words, is the exceptions
clause a mere default, a sticky default, or is it mandatory?
Since the hypothetical is speculative, we can skip the technical
question of proper treaty interpretation and start with the normative question: What would be the rationale for making such an
238. See Céline Lévesque & Andrew Newcombe, Canada, in COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED
MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 53, 88 (Chester Brown ed., 2013). Increasingly treaties have
incorporated more specific clauses to that effect with regard to indirect expropriation claims,
but generally not in the context of FET. See Arato, supra note 2, at 263-64.
239. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
240. Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-China,
art. 13, Sept. 9, 2012 [hereinafter China-Canada BIT], http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_tobe
deleted/iia/docs/bits/canada_china.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q3F-BMME]. Several of Canada’s
BIT’s include clauses of this kind. See Lévesque & Newcombe, supra note 238, at 88.
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exceptions clause difficult to contract around? In my view, there is
a compelling argument about agency costs here. The reality of foreign direct investment is that major investment projects are often
executed by relatively low-ranking state actors—and often employees of state-owned enterprises. Many states lack the resources (or
expertise) to rigorously vet these contracts across all government
agencies for whom they might be relevant. If a hypothetical treaty
exceptions clause were a mere default, a contractual stabilization
clause like the above would seem to have the effect of abrogating the
exception completely. States might thus be justifiably worried about
the possibility of lower-level officials without all relevant expertise
waiving the state’s regulatory exemptions under the treaty. Making
the treaty exceptions sticky or mandatory would go a long way
toward addressing these agency costs. A mandatory rule would
eliminate such costs completely, though at the expense of some of
the State’s bargaining power should it affirmatively want to offer
such a stabilization clause in full knowledge of the consequences. A
sticky default rule, dependent on a “notwithstanding international
law” clause, would at least help ensure that the state officials were
contracting on behalf of the state with adequate information.
Agency costs might provide a good justification for making a general exceptions provision resistant to contractual opt-out. If states
were to contemplate enacting such a clause, they might take pains
to make it sticky or even mandatory. Of course, if they were so
inclined, it would be safest to do so explicitly in the treaty text—in
the mode of the CISG, or in national contract law—by indicating
whether the clause could be waived at all, and if so, through which
magic words. We need not speculate about how an interpreter
should address this question absent any affirmative treaty language. Suffice it to say that extreme caution would be appropriate.
Framed in formal international legal terms, treating a limited set
of treaty norms as sticky defaults could—in principle—resonate
with the object and purpose of investment treaties. But such instances would have to be strictly justified. The treaties’ twin goals are,
again, to protect and promote foreign direct investment.241 In the
context of contractual investments, this means respecting the parties’ bargains. In most cases, this will mean privileging the parties’
241. See Yackee, supra note 12, at 398.
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choices. However, partially constraining choice may occasionally be
necessary to ensure that the law is protecting real bargains— ensuring that they are arms-length deals between sufficiently sophisticated parties. And treaty parties may well seek to constrain party
choice in the service of values wholly extrinsic to the logic of
contract. This may mean that some treaty norms are properly
understood as stickier than others.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD REFORMING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
Investment treaties are creating a new international law of
contracts, governing arrangements between states and foreign
investors. But they are largely silent about what kind of law they
create, and in particular how their norms relate to the express
choices made by states and foreign investors in their covered contracts.242 I have argued that the jurisprudence on this issue is
remarkably inconsistent and unclear, creating significant uncertainty for states and investors alike.243 Moreover, uncertainty is not
the only problem. Though tribunals have resolved the issue in all
kinds of ways, the tendency appears to favor privileging treaty
norms over the parties’ duly negotiated contractual arrangements—
often based on the assumption that treaty and contract can be
neatly separated. As mere domestic law, the assumption goes, a
contract can never vitiate a treaty right. The tendency toward interpreting investment treaties rigidly vis-à-vis investment contracts
benefits neither states nor investors ex ante. Rigidity unnecessarily
constrains the state’s capacity to safeguard its future regulatory
autonomy,244 and inefficiently constrains each party’s negotiating
power. An international law of investment contracts is indeed
emerging, in fits and spurts, but it has a long way to go toward
achieving the nuance and systematicity appropriate to a global
regime of private law.
The key to resolving the treaty/contract issue lies in appreciating the function of choice in the logic of contract.245 As a matter of
242.
243.
244.
245.

See Arato, supra note 2, at 546.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.
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formal treaty interpretation, the investment treaty’s object and
purpose of protecting and promoting investment is generally best
served by prioritizing the choices made by states and foreign investors in their contracts. Protecting an investment contract
generally means respecting the terms of the bargain actually struck
by the contracting parties, rather than invoking the treaty to
rewrite it.
At the same time, prioritizing party choice has tangible policy
benefits for both states and foreign investors. As a policy matter,
prioritizing choice is optimal from the ex ante perspective of both
states and investors. Privileging contractual choice in investment
law is, unsurprisingly, the best way to enable investors to secure
efficient contracts with foreign sovereigns. But it is equally the best
way to empower states, without giving up on all security for
investors. Contractual freedom here enables states to manage risk
to their regulatory capacities. Privileging choice recognizes that the
contracting parties are best positioned to regulate their interactions
themselves and empowers them to do so. This means understanding
treaty norms as mere defaults, which can be overturned by any
explicit contract language (if not choice of law).
Insofar as they relate to contracts, investment treaties should be
presumptively interpreted in such a way as to prioritize party
choice. As a corollary to that principle, however, a degree of constraint on party liberty can be autonomy-enhancing in some
instances.246 Privileging the treaty over terms in the contract may
make sense under certain limited circumstances—as, for example,
a sticky default in cases when informational asymmetries seem
likely to create a market failure or otherwise undermine the goals
of the investment treaty. Given their centrality in the investment
treaty system, forum selection provisions might be a plausible
candidate.247 Constraints on choice might also be justified on the
basis of values completely extrinsic to contract—as might be the
case with general exceptions clauses in certain BITs modelled on
GATT Article XX.248 But in any case, adjudicators ought to view

246. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 97.
247. See supra Part II.A.
248. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
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such situations as exceptional, and carefully justify deviation from
the norm of privileging party choice.
Investment treaties have given rise to an international law of
investment contracts, if only in fits and spurts. To constitute a fully
coherent and legitimate system of contract law, the regime must
better appreciate the function of choice in the logic of contract. In
other words, I am arguing that the regulatory ideal of an international law of investment contracts would presumptively prioritize
the choices of contracting parties against a system of mostly default
background rules. Needless to say, this discussion cannot be complete without acknowledging the significant institutional difficulties
with moving toward that ideal in a systematic way.
As should by now be clear, international investment law is
frustratingly fragmented—comprised of thousands of treaties, which
are interpreted with semiprecedential effect on an ad hoc basis, by
one-off arbitral panels.249 As a result, there is little hope for a quick
global fix to the treaty/contract question—short of the seemingly
remote possibilities of erecting a single multilateral investment
agreement or a coherent judicial system for investor-state dispute
settlement. Absent major institutional change, these problems are
not likely to be resolved by a single legislative action or a single
authoritative interpretation.
The real prospects for reform are piecemeal. Arbitral interpretation provides one limited path, even under the constraint of our
current fragmented institutions. Arbitrators can certainly do better
to consider and respect the choices made by states and investors as
contracting parties. And, as importantly, they can generally do
better to justify their reasoning in resolving the relationship between treaty and contract, one way or the other. Though it might
not do much to resolve the problem of uncertainty, tribunals should
still err on the side of giving effect to the parties’ contractual bargain absent strong reasons for restricting party choice in some
way.250
But by far the most legitimate pathway for reform lies with the
treaty-making power. States themselves can best resolve the
treaty/contract problem by reworking their treaties to specify how
249. See supra Part II.
250. See supra Part III.
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their provisions relate to contracts. This might be as simple as CISG
Article 6, which sets out a general rule prioritizing contractual
choice over treaty terms with a few exceptions.251 Or it might be
done in a more involved way by enumerating which treaty provisions can be contracted around as mere defaults, which provisions
require specific language to waive, and which provisions, if any,
should be understood as mandatory.
Though by no means an easy path, treaty reform represents the
only reasonably realistic way to overcome both the problems of
uncertainty and rigidity at once. Only formally deciding the relationship between treaty and contract in investment treaties themselves can signal to contracting parties ex ante that their carefully
negotiated choices will ultimately be given effect. Such certainty and
flexibilty are essential toward redeeming the purposes of investment
treaties, without unduly burdening the states parties’ regulatory
capacities of our emergent international law of investment contracts.

251. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 6.

